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  INTRODUCTION   
The obedience to orders defense has a unique place in the 
criminal justice system. As a military-based defense, it allows a 
soldier to escape liability by arguing that she was simply fol-
lowing orders when she committed the supposed crime.1 The 
defense carries the same requirements as many civilian crimi-
nal law defenses, such as self-defense, mistake of law, or du-
ress.2 Most notably, the defendant’s state of mind is subjected 
to some level of objective scrutiny.3 This focus on objective scru-
tiny, however, fails to fully appreciate the government’s im-
proper role in a crime where a soldier is simply doing what she 
was told.4
 
 1. See, e.g., United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 26–27 (C.M.A. 1973). 
 In an effort to provide a defense that better serves 
soldiers, this Article presents the first reconceptualization of 
the obedience to orders defense that is more closely aligned 
with the civilian defense of entrapment. Entrapment—along 
with its unique requirements—appropriately acknowledges the 
government’s role in pressuring the defendant to commit the 
crime. Recognizing that obedience to orders also involves a type 
of government coercion, this Article finally reorients the de-
fense accordingly and, in the process, creates a more narrowly 
 2. See infra Part II.A. 
 3. See generally Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Bi-
ography in Comparative Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233 (2010); 
V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1691 (2003).  
 4. See infra Parts I.E.1, II.A. 
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tailored defense that more closely comports with our moral in-
tuitions.  
The history of obedience to orders traces back to the nine-
teenth century.5 Although the scope of immunity that the de-
fense confers has changed through time, its basic contours have 
not.6 In a criminal prosecution, the defendant can argue that 
she was simply following orders when she committed the crim-
inal act.7 A successful application of the defense carries two re-
quirements—one subjective, one objective.8 The subjective com-
ponent asks whether the defendant knew the order was 
unlawful.9 If so, the defense will not be successful.10 Assuming 
the defendant did not know the unlawful nature of the order, 
the second step turns to scrutinizing this assessment.11 The op-
erative question is whether a soldier of common understanding 
in the defendant’s situation also would not have known the or-
der was unlawful.12 The latter, objective step seeks to examine 
whether the defendant’s subjective state of mind was reasona-
ble.13
In analyzing this defense, scholars and courts have almost 
exclusively focused on interpreting the above-mentioned objec-
tive standard.
  
14 How do you define a “person of common under-
standing?” Should it include the soldier’s particular experiences 
and training? How easy is it to ascertain illegality when the act 
implicates broader military objectives?15
In one respect, the use of dual state-of-mind requirements, 
and the use of objective scrutiny specifically, is perhaps not 
surprising. Most civilian criminal law defenses also have these 
 To be sure, these are 
important questions. But this inquiry assumes, in the first in-
stance, that the dual model is the right model.  
 
 5. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (rejecting the de-
fense where Little had orders from the President of the United States); infra 
Part I.A. 
 6. James B. Insco, Defense of Superior Orders Before Military Commis-
sions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 389, 399–407 (2003). 
 7. See id. at 399. 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.A and accompanying notes.  
 15. See infra Part II.A and accompanying notes. 
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two elements.16 A defendant must have a good faith belief and, 
more importantly, this belief must pass a reasonable person 
standard.17 Both the “reasonable person” and the “soldier of 
common understanding” standards share the same purpose. 
They are hypothetical constructs intended to objectively scruti-
nize the defendant’s actions or state of mind.18 The rationale for 
these objective requirements is to promulgate a uniform com-
munity standard that regulates the behavior of citizens.19
Obedience to orders has been most closely associated with 
the civilian criminal law defenses of mistake of law and du-
ress—both of which carry the aforementioned dual state-of-
mind requirements.
  
20 Mistake of law involves a defendant who 
mistakenly relies on an official statement of the law that a par-
ticular act is not a crime.21 Based on this interpretation, the de-
fendant carries out the relevant acts, thinking she is doing 
nothing illegal. This is like obedience to orders, where a de-
fendant also mistakenly believes that, by following the orders 
of her commanding officer, she is not committing a crime. Du-
ress involves a defendant who commits a crime because of 
threats of immediate bodily harm or death.22 The defendant is 
coerced into doing the act.23
But what sets obedience to orders apart from both duress 
and mistake of law is the presence of government coercion. On-
ly the former involves a government soldier ordering an indi-
vidual defendant to commit a crime.
 This, too, is similar to the defense 
of obedience to orders, where a soldier feels pressured into 
obeying a military order because of the threat of criminal pun-
ishment for disobedience.  
24
 
 16. See infra Parts II.A, III.A–B.  
 In the mistake of law 
case, the defendant is making her own choice to rely on an offi-
cial interpretation, without any pressure from the government, 
and in the case of duress, the defendant is pressured by a pri-
vate citizen. In short, the government plays no active role in ei-
 17. See generally Elaine M. Chiu, Culture as Justification, Not Excuse, 43 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1317, 1338 (2006) (“Of course, a good faith subjective belief 
is essential but it is only the beginning of the inquiry. Objectivity is necessary 
for the criminal law to function as the moral voice of the community.”).  
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.2. 
 21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (1985).  
 22. United States v. Sawyer, 558 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.2. 
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ther defense. This begs the question, then, of why obedience to 
orders carries the same dual state-of-mind requirements as 
these two defenses. It turns out that the law of entrapment 
shares a similar element of government pressure but does not 
carry the dual state-of-mind requirements.25
The entrapment defense is a relatively recent phenomenon 
and applies in both military and civilian courts.
 Courts and schol-
ars alike have overlooked the inconsistent treatment of these 
two defenses. This Article explores this inconsistency and ar-
gues that because both share the unique feature of government 
involvement, obedience to orders should be restructured to 
more closely parallel entrapment.  
26 A defendant 
can escape criminal liability by showing that undercover gov-
ernment agents unlawfully pressured or otherwise persuaded 
her to commit the target crime.27 Courts use one of two tests. 
The subjective test—used by a majority of jurisdictions—
focuses solely on the defendant’s state of mind and whether she 
was otherwise predisposed to commit the crime.28 Unlike mis-
take of law or duress, entrapment does not involve further 
scrutiny of the defendant’s state of mind.29 A minority of juris-
dictions use the objective test, which focuses solely on the na-
ture of the government’s tactics and whether a law-abiding citi-
zen would have succumbed to the pressure.30 While this, too, is 
an objective standard, its role is quite different from the objec-
tive component in mistake of law or duress. There, courts objec-
tively scrutinize the defendant’s subjective state of mind to as-
certain whether a reasonable person would have also thought 
or done the same thing.31 With entrapment, the objective test 
does not in any way examine or otherwise analyze the defend-
ant’s state of mind.32
 
 25. See infra Part IV.A. 
 Its purpose is simply to ask what a law-
 26. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 27. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932). 
 28. See id. at 451. Federal jurisdictions, military courts, and the majority 
of states use this test. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL R.C.M. 916(g) 
(2012), amended by Exec. Order 13593, 3 C.F.R. 13593 (2012) [hereinafter 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012]; John D. Lombardo, Causation and “Ob-
jective” Entrapment: Toward a Culpability-Centered Approach, 43 UCLA. L. 
REV. 209, 258 (1996) (noting thirty-nine states do not apply the objective test 
and even those that do are implementing more subjective measures).  
 29. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
 30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985); Lombardo, supra note 28, at 231–
32. 
 31. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.04(3)(b), 2.09(1). 
 32. Lombardo, supra note 28, at 211–12. 
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abiding citizen would have done in the defendant’s situation, 
regardless of what the defendant actually thought or did.33
The rationale for this difference centers on the fact that the 
government plays a key role in the crime, and so there is less of 
a reason for promulgating a uniform community standard, as in 
the case of duress or mistake of law.
  
34 With the subjective 
standard, the government is seen as partly culpable for the 
crime, thus reducing the relative blameworthiness of the de-
fendant.35 This focus on culpability invokes retributive notions 
of justifying punishment.36 The objective standard, on the other 
hand, finds its rationale based squarely on utilitarian 
grounds.37 Holding the defendant not liable will deter the gov-
ernment from using overbearing tactics on citizens in the fu-
ture.38
Obedience to orders looks a lot like entrapment. Both in-
volve the government pressuring the defendant to commit the 
crime.
  
39 To be clear, the type of government involvement may 
be different. Entrapment typically involves inducement or 
trickery, whereas obedience to orders involves more straight-
forward coercion.40 But this does not change the common ele-
ment of active government involvement, something present in 
neither duress nor mistake of law. If entrapment as a doctrine 
is valued as a legal defense and its underlying rationales im-
portantly account for the government’s role, one cannot ignore 
that obedience to orders also shares similar government partic-
ipation in the crime but currently does not carry the same re-
quirements. In fact, because obedience to orders implicates 
qualitatively greater pressure than entrapment, it stands to 
reason that the former should, a fortiori, share the same under-
lying rationales as the latter to support a less stringent level of 
scrutiny.41
 
 33. See infra Part IV.A.2, 4. 
 Disobeying an order carries the threat of criminal 
 34. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
 35. Lombardo, supra note 28, at 214. 
 36. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
 37. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
 38. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
 39. See infra Part IV.B. 
 40. See infra Part IV.B. 
 41. See infra Part IV.B. 
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punishment.42
Using the entrapment model in lieu of the current dual 
model would mean applying the subjective or objective test, 
without the aforementioned objective scrutiny targeting the de-
fendant’s state of mind. The subjective test would ask whether 
a soldier was otherwise predisposed to follow the order, and 
with the objective test the focus would be whether a hypothet-
ical soldier could have otherwise refused executing the order.
 There is no parallel sanction if an entrapped de-
fendant decides not to acquiesce to the government’s pressure. 
43 
This Article does not necessarily take a position on which test 
should be adopted. Either remolding appropriately recognizes 
the role of the government and tracks the rationale for these 
respective tests.44 Similar to the rationale of the subjective en-
trapment test, the soldier in the obedience to orders case would 
be less culpable for the crime because the military promulgated 
an unlawful order. From a retributive point of view, this makes 
sense. The government—through the authority of the superior 
order—is partly culpable for the crime.45 With the objective 
test, the concern is not with the soldier’s relative culpability 
but rather with how to prevent future soldiers from being 
placed in this compromising situation.46 Under a utilitarian 
model, a successful application of the defense would incentivize 
the government to better train commanding soldiers so they do 
not issue such orders.47
While consistency of doctrine and relevance of underlying 
rationale are important norms in promulgating the require-
ments of a criminal law defense, this Article’s reconceptualiza-
tion of obedience to orders is not simply an academic exercise. 
Realigning the defense to mirror entrapment ultimately creates 
a defense that is more narrowly tailored to the situation and 
thus one that more accurately comports with our intuitive no-
tions of when a soldier should or should not be held liable for 
following an unlawful order. It is not problematic for my posi-
tion that entrapment, relative to other defenses, is considered 
 
 
 42. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at art. 
90 (punishing a soldier for assaulting or willfully disobeying superior commis-
sioned officer).  
 43. Even though soldiers are required to obey orders (unlike their civilian 
counterparts who are entrapped), these tests can still effectively be applied in 
the military context. See infra Part IV.B.  
 44. See infra Part IV.B. 
 45. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
 46. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
 47. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
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rarely successful.48 In one respect, this is the nature of criminal 
law defenses. They are not supposed to be easy to satisfy.49 
More to the point, there is nothing to suggest that the basic 
components of the defense are overly disadvantageous to de-
fendants. The low success rate may have more to do with its 
application rather than the standard itself.50 Adopting these el-
ements in the unique military context—with its qualitatively 
different level of coercion—ultimately creates an obedience to 
orders defense that better serves soldiers caught in a difficult 
situation.51
The Article is divided into four parts. Part I discusses the 
history of the obedience to orders defense and its modern-day 
codification. Part II surveys scholars’ reactions to this defense 
and introduces why it is unique amongst most criminal law de-
fenses. Part III explains why duress and mistake of law defens-
es, rather than others, have come to be associated with the 
obedience to orders defense and why this association is inappo-
site. This Part highlights the connection between the objective 
scrutiny test found in these defenses and the lack of govern-
ment coercion in the commission of the crime. Part IV describes 
the contours of the entrapment defense, including the subjec-
tive and objective tests currently used, as well as the unique 
role of the government in the defense. This Part goes on to ex-
plain why obedience to orders should be restructured to more 
closely resemble entrapment. It focuses on applying the doctri-
  
 
 48. See Francesca Laguardia, Terrorists, Informants, and Buffons: The 
Case for Downward Departures as a Response to Entrapment, 17 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 171, 205 & n.174 (2013) (finding that entrapment is rarely suc-
cessful and even more rarely successful in cases involving violent crimes be-
cause the defendant must admit to having actually committed the crime, 
which may pose a hurdle for a jury to nonetheless acquit the defendant); Dru 
Stevenson, Entrapment by Numbers, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 15 (2005) 
(“The conventional wisdom is that it is rarely raised and that it rarely suc-
ceeds.”); Stephen G. Valdes, Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study of 
Criminal Law Defenses, Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea 
Negotiations, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1709, 1715–16 (2005) (“[T]he entrapment de-
fense arose in 0.08% of cases and succeeded in one-third of these cases.”).  
 49. Cf. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presump-
tions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1361 
(1979) (“From the vantage point of the Constitution, a change in law favorable 
to defendants is not necessarily good, nor is an innovation favorable to the 
prosecution necessarily bad. In short, determining the constitutionality of 
an affirmative defense according to whether it makes conviction more or less 
likely than under some prior regime seems to us unsound in principle, as well 
as unworkable in practice.”). 
 50. See Stevenson, supra note 48, at 13 n.33. 
 51. See infra Part IV.B–C.  
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nal elements and their respective underlying rationales to the 
obedience to orders case. It concludes by comparing two real-
world hypotheticals and illustrating how our intuitions are bet-
ter served using the entrapment tests instead of the current 
dual state-of-mind model.  
I.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE OBEDIENCE TO 
ORDERS DEFENSE   
Part I examines the historical development of the obedi-
ence to orders defense.52
A. EARLY USE: EIGHTEENTH CENTURY THROUGH THE CIVIL 
WAR 
 First, it traces the early use of the de-
fense in the United States from the nineteenth century through 
the Civil War. Next, this Part focuses on the state of the de-
fense from World War I through World War II and briefly dis-
cusses how the international community has defined the de-
fense. The focus then shifts to the codification of the defense in 
military courts. Finally, this Part highlights modern cases that 
have utilized the defense, including United States v. Calley, the 
foremost comprehensive judicial analysis of obedience to orders.  
The earliest American cases raising the obedience to orders 
defense steadfastly refused to recognize it as a valid excuse.53 
The prevailing military code during the early parts of the Re-
public did not explicitly address this defense, though it prohib-
ited, by threat of criminal punishment, disobeying any lawful 
order.54 The first American case to raise the defense was in fact 
a civil case from the early nineteenth century,55 Little v. 
Barreme, which arose out of the hostilities between France and 
the United States.56
 
 52. Much of this discussion draws from Aubrey Daniel’s summary of the 
defense through United States history. See Aubrey M. Daniel, The Defense of 
Superior Orders, 7 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 480–96 (1973).  
 The defendant, a Navy captain, seized a 
 53. See id. at 483. 
 54. See, e.g., ARTICLES OF WAR art. VII (1775) (“Any officer or soldier, who 
. . . shall disobey any lawful commands of his superior officer, shall suffer such 
punishment as shall, according to the nature of his offense, be ordered by the 
sentence of a general court-martial.”); Bradley J. Nicholson, Courts-Martial in 
the Legion Army: American Military Law in the Early Republic, 1792–1796, 
144 MIL. L. REV. 77, 80–84 (1994) (noting that the Articles of War, the early 
American military code similar to the British military code, simply required 
that soldiers not disobey lawful superior orders). 
 55. See Insco, supra note 6, at 399. 
 56. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
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Danish ship in reliance on an executive order issued by the 
president and was later sued for trespass by the owner of the 
ship.57 Congress had passed an act that authorized Navy cap-
tains to seize ships bound for a French port.58 However, the 
president issued an executive order that exceeded this grant to 
include any ship bound to or from a French port.59 In good faith 
reliance on this illegal executive order, the Navy captain seized 
a ship that was not headed to a French port.60 In a subsequent 
suit for damages, the captain raised the possibility of the de-
fense to the ship owner’s trespass claim.61
Writing for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall, 
while ultimately rejecting the defense, debated whether relief 
should be warranted in light of the nature of military service 
and the necessity of following orders: 
 
That implicit obedience which military men usually pay to the orders 
of their superiors, which indeed is indispensably necessary to every 
military system, appeared to me strongly to imply the principle that 
those orders, if not to perform a prohibited act, ought to justify the 
person whose general duty it is to obey them, and who is placed by 
the laws of his country in a situation which in general requires that 
he should obey them.62
Nevertheless, Marshall concluded that as a matter of law, 
the captain’s actions constituted trespass, and no instruction by 
a superior could legalize or otherwise change the unlawful na-
ture of this act.
 
63
United States v. Bright was the first criminal case to apply 
the standard set out in Barreme.
  
64 The defendant, a Pennsylva-
nia state militia member, was ordered by the Pennsylvania 
governor to interfere with the official duties of a United States 
marshal.65 Like the order in Barreme, the governor’s command 
exceeded his authority.66
 
 57. Id. at 177–78. 
 The defendant was criminally charged 
for this interference and raised obedience to orders as a de-
 58. Id. at 177. 
 59. Id. at 178. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 179. During this time, the Court also affirmed that a soldier’s 
disobedience of a lawful order warrants criminal punishment. See Wilkes v. 
Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 88, 91–92 (1849). 
 63. Barreme, 6 U.S. at 179. 
 64. See United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809); Daniel, 
supra note 52, at 483. 
 65. Bright, 24 F. Cas. at 1233–34. 
 66. Id. at 1237–38. 
  
2014] ENTRAPPED 2113 
 
fense.67
The argument [for an obedience to orders defense] is imposing, but 
very unsound. In a state of open and public war where military law 
prevails, and the peaceful voice of municipal law is drowned in the 
din of arms, great indulgences must necessarily be extended to the 
acts of subordinate officers done in obedience to the orders of their 
superiors. But even there the order of a superior officer to take the 
life of a citizen, or to invade the sanctity of his house and to deprive 
him of his property, would not shield the inferior against charge of 
murder or trespass, in the regular judicial tribunals of the country.
 In rejecting this defense, the Court cited Barreme and 
stated: 
68
The circuit court nevertheless seemed to acknowledge the 
difficult position the defendant faced. Had he not obeyed the 
governor’s order, the court recognized that he could have been 
prosecuted before a military or state court for failing to obey a 
superior order.
 
69 The court ultimately did not give this consid-
eration much weight, as it also noted that any such prosecution 
would lead to an acquittal because the order itself was unlaw-
ful.70 Other criminal cases during this period similarly 
acknowledged the importance of following military orders but 
concluded that they should not serve as a defense to an other-
wise unlawful act.71
Shortly thereafter, United States v. Jones became the first 
case to suggest the circumstances under which such a defense 
may potentially apply.
  
72 The case involved a defendant who was 
charged with piracy and threatening of bodily harm.73 The de-
fendant, along with other members of the crew and upon the 
order of his captain, boarded another vessel, looted valuables, 
and assaulted members of the other vessel’s crew.74 The court 
rejected the defendant’s argument that he was merely following 
the orders of his captain.75
 
 67. Id. 
 The court began by noting that “[n]o 
military or civil officer can command an inferior to violate the 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1238.  
 70. Id. 
 71. See, e.g., United States v. Bevans, 24 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1816) (recognizing the importance of following military orders but ultimately 
concluding that this importance does not matter when the orders “are against 
the express provisions of the law”); Hyde v. Melvin, 11 Johns 521, 523–24 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814) (holding the fact that the defendant acted under the 
command of his colonel as no excuse for his actions).  
 72. See United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653, 657–58 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813). 
 73. Id. at 654–55.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 657–58.  
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laws of his country; nor will such command excuse . . . the 
act.”76 Focusing on the state of mind of the defendant, the court 
went on to say that a defendant could not avail himself of this 
defense where “he knows, or ought to know” that the action or-
dered was illegal.77 Here, it was possible that the defendant and 
the accompanying crew—regardless of any orders commanding 
the contrary—either knew or should have known that assault 
and stealing from another vessel were illegal acts.78 This early 
test foreshadows modern versions of the defense and its focus 
on both the actual state of mind of the defendant (subjective 
component) and the state of mind of a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s circumstances (objective component).79
The Civil War and its aftermath prompted other cases that 
further developed the elements of the defense and its related 
applicability.
 
80 One notable case, Riggs v. State, concerned a de-
fendant who may have been given an order by his superior of-
ficer to kill another officer.81 The murder was not provoked or 
otherwise part of combat.82
 
 76. Id. at 657. Other cases from this period affirmed this test: whether the 
defendant knew or should have known the order was unlawful. See, e.g., 
Despan v. Olney, 7 F. Cas. 534, 535–36 (C.C.D. R.I. 1852) (“If [a military of-
ficer] receives an order from his superior, which, from its nature, is within the 
scope of his lawful authority, and nothing appears to show that that authority 
is not lawfully exerted in the particular case, he is bound to obey it; and if it 
turns out, that his superior had secretly abused or exceeded his power, the su-
perior, who is thus guilty, must answer for it, not the inferior, who reasonably 
supposed he was only doing his duty.”).  
 The issue, however, was whether a 
defendant could raise the defense that he was simply obeying 
 77. Jones, 26 F. Cas. at 658. 
 78. See id. The jury ultimately returned a verdict of “not guilty,” however. 
Id. 
 79. See infra Part I.D.  
 80. In 1863, President Lincoln promulgated revised rules of combat, 
dubbed the Lieber Code (because they were based on Professor Leiber’s in-
structions), which sought to supplement the Articles of War. This new Code 
did not address the obedience to orders defense. See Daniel, supra note 52, at 
484–85 (discussing how Professor Lieber, assuming that the courts would con-
trol the issue, left out the obedience to orders defense from the Lieber Code); 
Gary D. Solis, Obedience of Orders and the Law of War: Judicial Application 
in American Forums, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 481, 491 (1999); Gideon M. Hart, 
Note, Military Commissions and the Lieber Code: Toward a New Understand-
ing of the Jurisdictional Foundations of Military Commissions, 203 MIL. L. 
REV. 1, 34–35 (2010) (discussing how the Lieber Code sought to update the Ar-
ticles of War).  
 81. See Riggs v. State, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 85, 88–89 (Tenn. 1866). One of 
the issues before the Tennessee Supreme Court was whether the defendant 
actually heard the order. See id. at 90.  
 82. See id. at 89. 
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the orders of his superior officer.83 In rejecting this excuse, the 
trial court distinguished a lawful superior order—which a sub-
ordinate is bound to follow and would provide a defense to a 
criminal charge—from an unlawful order, which cannot excuse 
criminal behavior.84
[A]n order illegal in itself, and not justified by the rules and usages of 
war, or in its substance being clearly illegal, so that a man of ordinary 
sense and understanding would know, as soon as he heard the order 
read or given, that such order was illegal, would afford [the defend-
ant] no protection for a crime committed under such order . . . .
 In describing the latter, the court ex-
plained the objective component of the defense: 
85
The jury found that under the circumstances, any man of 
“common mind” would have known that the order to shoot was 
unlawful and would have refrained from killing the officer.
 
86 
The court did not specify from where this standard arose, but 
its focus on ordinary sense and common understanding is an 
early expression of the objective standard currently used.87
Not all courts denied the defense based on this standard. 
In one notable Civil War case, In re Fair, two soldiers were 
charged with murder after shooting another soldier escaping 
from custody.
  
88 The soldiers were under orders to shoot two 
prisoners escaping custody if they did not stop when they or-
dered them to.89 The court found the defendants not liable for 
the charge partially on the ground that they were following or-
ders.90 In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on the 
state of mind of the defendants as well as what a person of 
common understanding would have done. As to the first, the 
court held that the defendants should not be convicted if they 
“acted under such orders in good faith . . . [and] with an honest 
purpose to perform [their] supposed duty.”91
 
 83. See id. at 86–87. 
 Turning to the ob-
jective requirement, the court reasoned: “While I do not say 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. (noting that the jury convicted the defendant after receiving 
these instructions on the obedience to orders defense).  
 87. See infra Part I.D. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court awarded 
the defendant a new trial due to the lack of evidence on the record. See Riggs, 
43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) at 90–91. However, it found “no error” with the trial court’s 
instruction on the obedience to orders defense. Id. at 86–87. 
 88. In re Fair, 100 F. 149, 150 (C.C.D. Neb. 1900). 
 89. Id. The order applied to both escaping prisoners, but it appears that 
the defendants only found and ultimately killed the one. See id.  
 90. See id. at 154–58. 
 91. Id. at 155. 
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that the order given to [the defendants] was in all particulars a 
lawful order, I do say that the illegality of the order, if illegal it 
was, was not so much so as to be apparent and palpable to the 
commonest understanding.”92
In articulating the objective standard, other cases from this 
period similarly focused on ordinary sense or common under-
standing as the appropriate litmus test.
  
93
B. ABSOLUTE DEFENSE: WORLD WARS I AND II 
  
For a brief period starting just prior to World War I, the 
military, in sharp contrast to the prevailing standard estab-
lished by civilian courts, allowed soldiers to invoke obedience to 
orders as a complete defense without any scrutiny of the de-
fendant’s state of mind.94 Under the revised military policy, sol-
diers would not be punished for offenses as long as they were 
acting under orders of their commanders.95
 
 92. Id. It should be noted that, in finding the defendants not guilty, the 
court also emphasized the fact that the defendants shot to disable the escaping 
prisoner, not to kill him. See id. Ultimately, the court felt that it should not 
intervene because the escaping prisoner had been charged with a military of-
fense, desertion, and the defendants were attempting to enforce military law. 
See id. at 156–58. 
 There was no eval-
 93. See, e.g., McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 1240 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) 
(“Except in a plain case of excess of authority, where at first blush it is appar-
ent and palpable to the commonest understanding that the order is illegal, I 
cannot but think that the laws should excuse the military subordinate when 
acting in obedience to the orders of his commander.”). But see Jones v. Com-
monwealth, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 34, 39–40 (Ky. 1866) (denying the defense of obe-
dience to orders outright because the act was illegal). 
 94. See Daniel, supra note 52, at 488–89; Solis, supra note 80, at 495–96.  
 95. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, RULES OF 
LAND WARFARE § 366 (1914) (“Individuals of the armed forces will not be pun-
ished for these offenses in case they are committed under the orders or sanc-
tion of their government or commanders.”). This army instruction served as a 
successor to the Lieber Code. See Daniel, supra note 52, at 488; Solis, supra 
note 80, at 491. This army instruction was not inconsistent with the contem-
poraneous publication, A Manual for Courts-Martial, Courts of Inquiry, and of 
Other Procedure Under Military Law, a military law manual that outlined the 
logistics of conducting a court-martial. See OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, A MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, COURTS OF 
INQUIRY, AND OF OTHER PROCEDURE UNDER MILITARY LAW, at xiii–xiv (1918) 
[hereinafter MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1918]; Solis, supra note 80, at 
496. The Manual explicitly provided that disobedience to a superior order was 
punishable unless the order was plainly illegal. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, 1918, supra, at app. 1, art. 64. Pursuant to the Rules of Land War-
fare, there was no punishment if the soldier followed this unlawful order. Id. 
And if he decided against following this unlawful order, the Manual explicitly 
exempted him from the crime of disobedience to orders. See Solis, supra note 
80, at 495–96.  
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uation of what the solider knew or a person of common under-
standing would have known.96 During this period, there do not 
appear to be any records of courts-martial relating to the “kill-
ing or maltreatment of German soldiers” by American sol-
diers.97 In the one case where the issue was raised, the solider 
was found not guilty of killing a prisoner simply because he 
was following orders.98
This remained the state of affairs until World War II, when 
the military revised its position to be comparable to the prevail-
ing civilian standard prior to World War I.
 
99 Once again, the de-
fense was not automatically an absolute bar to prosecution. The 
revised military code allowed obedience to orders to serve as a 
potential defense or mitigation for punishment but also noted 
that individuals who clearly violated laws and customs of war 
could be punished.100
C. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Historically, international law has not provided a con-
sistent approach to the availability of the obedience to orders 
defense.101 Major international treaties, by and large, have 
failed to address the defense.102
 
 96. Cf. Daniel, supra note 
 The Hague Convention, after 
World I, and the Geneva Convention, after World War II, were 
52, at 488 (“[O]bedience to orders became an 
absolute defense.”).  
 97. Id. at 488 & n.31.  
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. at 488–90. The 1928 edition of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 
however, did mention the availability of the obedience to orders defense. See 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL  
R.C.M. 148a, at 163 (1928), established by Exec. Order 4773 [hereinafter 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1928] (citation omitted) (“The general rule is 
that the acts of a subordinate officer or soldier, done in good faith and without 
malice in compliance with his supposed duty, or of superior orders, are justifi-
able, unless such acts are manifestly beyond the scope of his authority, and 
such that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know to be ille-
gal.”).  
 100. See U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, FM 27-10, RULES OF LAND WARFARE § 345.1 
(1944) (“Individuals . . . who violate the accepted laws and customs of war may 
be punished therefor. However, the fact that the acts complained of were done 
pursuant to the order of a superior or government sanction may be taken into 
consideration in determining culpability, either by way of defense or in mitiga-
tion of punishment.”). 
 101. See MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCI-
PLINE & THE LAW OF WAR 41 (1999); Insco, supra note 6, at 407–10. 
 102. Insco, supra note 6, at 407. 
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conspicuously silent on the issue.103 Just after World War I, 
however, the issue was tentatively raised in connection with 
war crimes committed by Germans. An Allied-led war crime 
commission proposed international prosecutions without the 
benefit of an obedience to orders defense.104 Dissents by the 
United States and Britain—who feared the precedential effect 
such a rule might have on their own soldiers—ultimately left 
the commission’s work unresolved, and the prosecutions were 
relegated to German national courts.105 A similar commission 
created by the newly formed United Nations after World War II 
also addressed this defense in the context of war crime prosecu-
tions.106 This commission recognized that the “[t]he question of 
individual responsibility and punishment in cases in which of-
fences were committed upon the orders of a . . . superior au-
thority by a subordinate pledged by law to obey superior orders, 
is one of great difficulty.”107 Following American courts on the 
issue, the United States proposed to the commission that the 
obedience to orders defense should be rejected “if the order was 
so manifestly contrary to the laws of war that a person of ordi-
nary sense and understanding would know or should know . . . 
that such an order was illegal.”108 Because the member states 
could not reach an agreement, the commission ultimately rec-
ommended that the validity of the defense be left to national 
courts.109
It was not until the Nuremberg Charter in 1945 and the 
resulting Nazi war trials that the Allied-led international 
community had the opportunity to take a strong and unified 
stance on the availability of the defense.
 
110
 
 103. See id.; Howard S. Levie, The Rise and Fall of an Internationally Codi-
fied Denial of the Defense of the Superior Orders, 30 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 
183, 199–200 (1991).  
 Due to the nature of 
 104. See Solis, supra note 80, at 496–97.  
 105. See id. at 497–99. It appears that the German courts allowed the 
German soldiers to raise the defense in what became known as the Leipzig 
Trials. See id. at 499. 
 106. Id. at 509.  
 107. U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 274 
(1948) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMIS-
SION]; see also Solis, supra note 80, at 483.  
 108. HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra 
note 107, at 278; see also Solis, supra note 80, at 510.  
 109. See HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, su-
pra note 107, at 278; see also Solis, supra note 80, at 509–10.  
 110. See Solis, supra note 80, at 515–16.  
  
2014] ENTRAPPED 2119 
 
the atrocities, the International Military Tribunal categorically 
rejected, as a way to avoid liability, the defense that a German 
soldier was simply following orders to kill innocent civilians as 
a way to avoid liability.111 The pertinent provision of the Char-
ter stated that the “fact that the defendant acted pursuant to 
order of his . . . superior shall not free him from responsibility, 
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tri-
bunal determines that justice so requires.”112 The last clause 
simply served the function of reducing a defendant’s sentence, 
not absolving the individual of all liability.113
The resulting trials under the Nuremberg Charter narrow-
ly circumscribed when a soldier could be relieved of responsibil-
ity for his actions.
  
114 The Tribunal stated: “The true test, which 
is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations, 
is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was 
in fact possible.”115
 
 111. See id. James Insco has suggested that similar considerations, along 
with evidentiary rule changes, may explain why the United States chose to 
create separate military tribunals for the attacks surrounding September 11th 
instead of using the established procedures under the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, see infra Part I.D (describing the history of the Code), which 
would have allowed for an obedience to orders defense. See Insco, supra note 
 The “moral choice” test required a showing 
6, 
at 411–17. The rules promulgated for the tribunals make no mention of the 
availability of the defense. Id. at 412. Given the nature of the terrorist attacks, 
it is not clear how such a defense would be viable. See id. at 412–13. However, 
Insco argues that allowing such a defense—which would probably only apply 
in limited circumstances—may have the benefit of providing legitimacy to the 
proceedings. Id. at 416–17. 
 112. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 8, in 1 INTERNA-
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 12 (1947); Daniel, supra note 52, at 
490.  
 113. Cf. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF “OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR OR-
DERS” IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 115–17 (1965) (“[The Charter] precludes any 
possibility of taking the fact of obedience to orders into account for the purpose 
of relieving the defendant of responsibility in the context of any defence what-
soever . . . .”).  
 114. See Daniel, supra note 52, at 490–91. 
 115. United States v. Ohlendorf (The Einsatzgruppen Case), in 4 
NUERENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUERENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 471 (1947) [hereinafter The Einsat-
zgruppen Case] (quoting 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 
112, at 224) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www 
.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-IV.pdf; see also Daniel, 
supra note 52, at 490. U.S. Military Tribunal II-A tried the defendants in The 
Einsatzgruppen Case after the International Military Tribunal declared organ-
izations of which they were members to be criminal. See The Einsatzgruppen 
Case, supra, at 3, 22. In deciding the case, the U.S. Military Tribunal relied 
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that the solider was under duress or threat of serious bodily 
harm from another when he committed the act.116 This Article 
later provides greater detail on the connection between the 
obedience to orders and the duress defenses.117 For now, it is 
enough to say that the Nuremberg trials envisioned duress as 
conceptually separate from an obedience to orders defense.118 In 
other words, the accused could not rely on the inherent coercion 
of the superior order as a defense. Something more was re-
quired, such as threats or other coercion whereby the soldier 
had no real choice in the matter.119 Following the Tribunal’s 
lead, the U.S. Military Tribunal trying The Einsatzgruppen 
Case reasoned in the following way: “The test to be applied is 
whether the subordinate acted under coercion or whether he 
himself approved of the principle involved in the order . . . . Su-
perior means superior in capacity and power to force a certain 
act. It does not mean superiority only in rank . . . .”120 Other tri-
bunals, including the Criminal Tribunals of Rwanda and Yugo-
slavia, have followed a similar path, applying the obedience to 
defense only for mitigation, not for exoneration.121
A noteworthy exception to the historical unavailability of 
the defense in international law is the Rome Statute of 1997, 
which established the permanent International Criminal 
Court.
  
122 While the United States is not a party to the statute, 
the court allows for the defense and employs a standard similar 
to that used by American courts.123
 
heavily on principles promulgated by the International Military Tribunal. See 
id. passim (citing the International Military Tribunal throughout the opinion). 
 A defendant can take ad-
 116. See Daniel, supra note 52, at 491.  
 117. See infra Part III.A. 
 118. See Daniel, supra note 52, at 490–92. There is, however, some debate 
among scholars as to whether this “moral choice” test was a separate defense 
of compulsion or duress—and thus served to supplement the Charter’s provi-
sion on the availability of the obedience to orders defense—or instead some-
thing intended to lessen the blanket rule established by the Charter. See 
DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 150–54.  
 119. See Daniel, supra note 52, at 491. Justice Jackson, in his opening re-
marks for the prosecution, explained that while the obedience to orders de-
fense was not available under the Charter, “we do not argue that the circum-
stances under which one commits an act should be disregarded in judging its 
legal effect.” DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 125–27.  
 120. The Einsatzgruppen Case, supra note 115, at 480; see also supra note 
115. 
 121. See Insco, supra note 6, at 409.  
 122. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, 33, July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.  
 123. See id; Insco, supra note 6, at 409 (discussing the circumstances under 
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vantage of the defense if he “did not know that the order was 
unlawful” and if “[t]he order was not manifestly unlawful.”124
D. CODIFICATION OF THE DEFENSE: THE AMERICAN MILITARY 
STANDARD 
  
It was not until after World War II that the American mili-
tary finally codified the obedience to orders defense and the 
conditions of its application. Congress enacted the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice in 1950,125 and while it did not mention 
the defense,126 the revised Manual for Courts-Martial—an ex-
ecutive order outlining the procedures of court-martial proceed-
ings—explicitly addressed the applicability of the defense.127
[T]he acts of a subordinate, done in good faith in compliance with his 
supposed duty or orders, are justifiable. This justification does not ex-
ist, however, when those acts are manifestly beyond the scope of his 
authority, or the order is such thata man of ordinary sense and un-
derstanding would know it to be illegal . . . .
 It 
provided: 
128
The language tracks the historical focus on both the subor-
dinate’s subjective state of mind and an objective person’s 
common understanding.
 
129
 
which the International Criminal Court recognizes the obedience to orders de-
fense); infra Part I.E (discussing the standard currently used by American 
courts).  
 This provision is not substantially 
changed in the current edition of the Manual for Courts-
Martial, which states, “It is a defense to any offense that the 
accused was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused knew 
 124. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 122, at 
art. 33(1). 
 125. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 
(1950) (repealed 1956). This enactment also established the military judicial 
system and its various levels of appellate review. Id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. The Manual for Courts-Martial dates back to 1890, see P. HENRY RAY, 
COMMANDING DEP’T, INSTRUCTIONS FOR COURTS-MARTIAL AND JUDGE ADVO-
CATES (1890), and has had numerous versions since then. See, e.g., supra notes 
95, 99 (including some of the editions of the Manual for Courts-Martial). The 
earliest mention of obedience to orders came in the 1928 edition, which includ-
ed similar language to the version of the Manual promulgated after Congress 
passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See supra note 99; infra note 128 
and accompanying text. 
 128. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL ¶ 197b (1951), as reprinted in Exec. 
Order No. 10,214, 3 C.F.R. Supp. E.O. 10,214, ¶ 197b (1949–1951) [hereinafter 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1951].  
 129. See supra notes 77–98. 
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the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and un-
derstanding would have known the orders to be unlawful.”130
The Korean War and its aftermath allowed for the first ap-
plication of the now codified defense. In United States v. Kind-
er, the defendant, who was on sentry duty, captured a Korean 
intruder.
 
131 He brought the intruder to the guard-house, and his 
superior officer ordered the defendant to execute the individu-
al.132 There was no evidence that the intruder posed any 
threat.133 The defendant was charged with premeditated mur-
der and raised the obedience to orders defense.134 The court cat-
egorically rejected the defense.135 Citing to a case discussing 
Riggs v. State, the court said that even if the defendant did not 
know the order was unlawful, a man of common understanding 
would have known that taking a life in this way was unlawful 
and would not have followed the order.136
E. MODERN CASES 
  
1. United States v. Calley 
Numerous decisions during the Vietnam conflict reaffirmed 
the principle that the obedience to orders defense is not availa-
ble if the order would have been manifestly illegal to a person 
of common understanding.137
 
 130. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 
 One notable case, United States v. 
Calley, provided the first comprehensive judicial analysis of 
28, at R.C.M. 916(d). 
It is important to note that a successful application of this defense does not 
bar prosecution of the commanding officer who gave the unlawful order. See 
Jason Sengheiser, Note, Command Responsibility for Omissions and Detainee 
Abuse in the “War on Terror”, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 693, 713–14 (2008) 
(discussing command responsibility and how commanding officers can be crim-
inally charged for orders they give). 
 131. United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742, 753 (A.F.B.R. 1954).  
 132. Id. at 753–54. 
 133. See id. at 753–55. 
 134. See id. at 752, 763. 
 135. See id. at 774. 
 136. See id. at 771–74 (“Human life being regarded as sacred, moral, reli-
gious and civil law proscriptions against its taking existing throughout our so-
ciety, we view the order as commanding an act so obviously beyond the scope 
of authority of the superior officer and so palpably illegal on its face as to ad-
mit of no doubt of its unlawfulness to a man of ordinary sense and under-
standing.”). The Army later clarified the obedience to orders defense in ac-
cordance with this standard. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW 
OF LAND WARFARE § 509 (1956).  
 137. See, e.g., United States v. Keenan, 39 C.M.R. 108, 115–17 (C.M.A. 
1969); United States v. Griffin, 39 C.M.R. 586, 589–90 (A.B.R. 1968). 
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this objective standard and how it should be applied.138 The de-
fendant, Lieutenant Calley, was charged and convicted by a ju-
ry for the murder of dozens of civilians in the village of My Lai 
in South Vietnam.139 The defendant claimed that he was follow-
ing the order of his commanding officer, who had instructed 
him to kill the civilians.140 One of the issues before the United 
States Court of Military Appeals (the highest military court at 
the time) was the appropriate objective standard for adjudicat-
ing the obedience to orders defense.141
The trial judge had instructed the jury that the acts of a 
subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order should 
impose no criminal liability unless the defendant knew the or-
der was unlawful or a person of common understanding would 
have known this.
 
142 In making a determination as to the de-
fendant’s subjective knowledge of the order’s unlawfulness, the 
trial court advised the jury to consider all relevant matters, in-
cluding the defendant’s rank, age, educational background, 
training, and prior operational experience in the area.143 It ap-
pears that the instruction relating to the defendant’s subjective 
knowledge was not in dispute on appeal.144 The defense simply 
claimed that the evidence showed Calley subjectively believed 
that the civilians were part of the enemy he was ordered to 
kill.145
The issue for the appellate court focused on the objective 
standard of palpable or manifest illegality.
 
146
 
 138. United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 29 (C.M.A. 1973). 
 The trial judge in-
structed the jury that even if they found the defendant did not 
 139. See id. at 21. According to Calley, his commanding officer gave him an 
order to destroy the My Lai village, though there was conflicting evidence of 
such an order. See id. at 23–24. Calley alleged that the commanding officer 
gave the order, first, a day before the strike during a briefing on the mission 
and then again by radio during the day of the engagement. Id. Calley ordered 
his subordinates to kill the villagers, including women and children, who were 
at the time being guarded but posed no danger to the soldiers. See id. at 24. 
Calley claimed these villagers were, however, hindering the platoon’s ability to 
progress. See id. at 33. It turned out that some of Calley’s subordinates re-
fused to follow his instruction to kill the villagers. See id. at 24.  
 140. See id. at 23–24.  
 141. See id. at 26–29.  
 142. Id. at 27.  
 143. See id.  
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. at 24–25. The general findings of guilt at the trial court did not 
specify whether the jury found that the defendant knew the order was unlaw-
ful. Id. at 25. 
 146. See id. at 27. 
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know the order was unlawful, he would still be guilty if they 
found that “under the circumstances, a man of ordinary sense 
and understanding would have known the order was unlaw-
ful.”147 The instructions stated that jurors should not “focus on 
Lieutenant Calley and the manner in which he perceived the 
legality of the order found to have been given him.”148 Rather, 
the focus should be on a person “of ordinary sense and under-
standing under the circumstances” and whether “in light of all 
the surrounding circumstances” this hypothetical construct 
would have known the order was unlawful.149 The court thus 
seemed to adopt a non-individualized objective standard. The 
defendant claimed the standard requiring that the order be 
palpably illegal to a person of “common understanding“ was too 
strict and should be changed to a person of “commonest under-
standing.”150 The defendant argued that using the former would 
prejudice those soldiers at the lower end of the experi-
ence/understanding spectrum who fall below this standard.151 
These individuals would have to face the dilemma of choosing 
either a criminal penalty for disobedience of an order (death, 
during time of war) or an equally serious penalty for following 
the unlawful order.152 While criminal punishment only applies 
to disobedience of lawful orders, a soldier who does not know 
the order is unlawful would not necessarily benefit from this 
restriction.153
The majority opinion for the appeal took some time exam-
ining the competing interests involved. Citing to an authority 
discussing Riggs, as well as citing to cases, the court, on the 
one hand, noted that the “common understanding” standard 
has had a long history in American military jurisprudence.
  
154
 
 147. Id. 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 151. See id.  
 152. Id.; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, pt. IV, art. 90c(2) (1984), 
as reprinted in Exec. Order No. 12,473, 3 C.F.R. pts. 100–101 Exec. Order 
12,473 (1984–1985) (incorporating by reference the text of the Manual, located 
at 49 Fed. Reg. 17,152 (Apr. 23, 1984)) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, 1984] (explaining what constitutes disobeying a superior officer). 
Disobedience of a lawful order during time of war may result in the death 
penalty. See id. at pt. IV, art. 90a.  
 153. See Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, at 28 & n.1; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 
1984, supra note 152, at pt. IV, art. 90a (stating that any soldier who “willfully 
disobeys a lawful command of his superior” shall be punished).  
 154. See Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, at 28.  
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However, the court also recognized that in the stress of combat, 
a soldier cannot be expected to make a refined legal determina-
tion as to the legality of an order.155 The court did not find this 
to be problematic, because, except in rare instances where the 
order was manifestly illegal, subordinates should presumptive-
ly follow a superior’s order.156 As to the defendant’s specific 
charge of error, the court ultimately concluded that there was 
no prejudice.157 It found that “whatever conceptual difference 
there may be between a person of ‘commonest understanding’ 
and a person of ‘common understanding,’ that difference could 
not have had any impact on [the jury] receiving the respective 
wordings in instructions.”158 The court focused on the fact that 
the defendant killed unarmed women and children—acts that 
under any objective standard would have been manifestly ille-
gal.159
The dissent challenged the majority’s conclusion that the 
difference in jury instructions as to the objective state-of-mind 
requirement would have had no meaningful impact.
  
160 The dis-
sent argued that the current standard—and its focus on com-
mon understanding—was too stringent.161 The dissent claimed 
the standard permitted serious punishment for those whose 
“training and attitude incline[d] them either to be enthusiastic 
about compliance with orders or not to challenge the authority 
of their superiors.”162 According to the dissent, the proposed in-
struction of “commonest understanding,” however, “properly 
balance[d] punishment for the obedience of an obviously illegal 
order” against a soldier’s duty to follow a superior’s direct or-
der.163 The dissent went on to elaborate how best to relay this 
objective state-of-mind requirement to the jury.164
 
 155. Id. at 28–29. 
 It suggested 
that a jury should find the defendant guilty notwithstanding an 
obedience to orders defense if “almost every member of the 
armed forces would have immediately recognized that the order 
was unlawful, and . . . that the [defendant] should have recog-
nized the order’s illegality as a consequence of his age, grade, 
 156. Id. at 28. 
 157. Id. at 29. 
 158. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 31–33 (Darden, C.J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. at 31. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 31–32. 
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intelligence, experience, and training.”165 The dissent’s proposed 
standard would have provided additional protection for the de-
fendant. For even if almost every member of the armed forces 
would find the order unlawful, the particular experiences and 
training of the defendant might suggest impunity. In other 
words, the dissent argued the defense should be successful as 
long as a soldier of the commonest understanding with the de-
fendant’s training and experience similarly would not have 
found the order to be unlawful.166
The dissent further explained that this standard could 
have resulted in a different verdict for Calley.
  
167 It pointed to 
Calley’s specific background and training, which together may 
have caused someone of the commonest understanding or 
someone in his shoes to not recognize the order to be unlaw-
ful.168 Along with testimony showing that Calley’s briefing con-
tained specific orders to kill all individuals, including women 
and children, the dissent also specifically pointed to Calley’s 
prior experience with hostile civilians in the area.169 In the past, 
when villagers were left behind by his unit, Calley’s unit had 
taken sniper fire from the rear, presumably from these individ-
uals.170 In addition, Calley had apparently received faulty intel-
ligence that the villagers were not innocent and were either en-
emies or enemy sympathizers.171 Combined, these facts, 
according to the dissent, suggested that a soldier of commonest 
understanding in the defendant’s position might not have read-
ily realized that the order to kill the villagers was unlawful.172
 
 165. Id. at 32. Interestingly, United States v. Kinder seemed to employ a 
standard closer to the one articulated by the dissent in Calley. See 14 C.M.R. 
742, 744 (A.F.B.R. 1954) (“In our view no rational being of the [defendant’s] 
age, formal education, and military experience could have, under the circum-
stances, considered the order lawful.”). 
  
 166. The dissent’s proposal appears to conflate two potentially distinct ob-
jective state-of-mind standards. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 31–33. The first is a per-
son of commonest understanding with no shared traits of the defendant, and 
the second is a person of commonest understanding with the same experience, 
training, etc. Id. It is not clear exactly what standard the dissent seeks to sup-
port or whether Calley’s decision to follow the order could be excused on the 
former alone. Resolution of this issue is not relevant here. The main takeaway 
is that the dissent’s proposed instruction would be more generous to potential 
defendants than the standard affirmed by the majority.  
 167. Id. at 33. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id.  
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2. Other Cases 
More recent cases have followed the majority’s holding in 
Calley and its reliance on common understanding as the appro-
priate objective state of mind standard. United States v. 
Pacheco involved a soldier who was charged with larceny after 
taking a weapon as a souvenir from a weapon’s cache during an 
operation in Haiti.173 Citing Calley, the court noted that any 
applicable obedience to orders defense would not succeed if the 
order was palpably illegal, which was analyzed from the per-
spective of a man of ordinary sense and understanding.174
The issues surrounding the detainees held in Iraq provided 
a more recent application of the defense. In defense of mal-
treatment charges of a detainee during an interrogation, the 
defendant in United States v. Smith argued that he was simply 
following orders.
  
175 The court affirmed the trial judge’s instruc-
tions that any obedience to orders defense would not excuse li-
ability unless “the [defendant] knew that the order was unlaw-
ful or unless the order was one which a person of ordinary 
common sense under the circumstances would know to be un-
lawful.”176
 
 173. United States v. Pacheco, 56 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 2001). 
  
 174. Id. at 7 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). Interestingly, this case involved an 
alleged order that was more discretionary than imperative in nature. Part 
III.B more closely analyzes this issue under the rubric of mistake of law.  
 175. United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 316 (C.A.A.F. 2010).  
 176. Id. at 321 n.7. The defendant was a military servicemember trained as 
a dog handler and was stationed in the confinement facility at Abu Ghraib, 
Iraq. Id. at 318–19. During an interrogation of one of the detainees, the de-
fendant allowed his unmuzzled dog to bark in the detainee’s face and to pull a 
sandbag off the detainee’s head with its teeth. Id. Charged with, inter alia, 
maltreatment, the defendant argued that he was simply following the orders 
of his commanding officer. Id. at 319–20. The court found that no evidence had 
been introduced that such an order was in fact given. Id. at 321. Other trials 
relating to detainee abuse similarly raised the obedience to orders defense and 
questioned whether the soldier knew or should have known the order was ille-
gal. See Kate Zernike, Soldiers Testify on Orders to Soften Prisoners in Iraq, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/13/national/ 
13abuse.html (noting that defendant unsuccessfully raised obedience to orders 
defense in prosecution for detainee abuse); Natalia M. Restivo, Defense of Su-
perior Orders in International Criminal Law as Portrayed in Three Trials: 
Eichmann, Calley and England 20–25 (Sept. 12, 2006) (unpublished student 
paper, Cornell Law School) (same), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell 
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=lps_papers. 
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II.  THE DUAL STATE-OF-MIND REQUIREMENTS   
Part II briefly explores scholarly reactions to the current 
two-part requirement and suggests why this standard is not 
the appropriate model for the obedience to orders defense. This 
Part begins by detailing the difficulty associated with defining 
the objective portion of the test. Next, it provides an explana-
tion for why this objective requirement has mistakenly become 
associated with the defense and introduces the notion of gov-
ernment coercion as something unique to obedience to orders.  
A. REACTIONS TO CURRENT MODEL 
Most of the discussion surrounding the obedience to orders 
defense has focused on how best to interpret and apply the two 
requirements.177 The subjective requirement is relatively 
straightforward and seeks to answer the question of “whether 
[the person] actually knew [the] orders to be unlawful.”178 Here, 
the jury looks at the defendant’s background, including her age, 
education, training, and experience.179 Knowledge, of course, 
means something akin to substantial certainty.180
 
 177. See, e.g., Ziv Bohrer, The Superior Orders Defense: A Principal-Agent 
Analysis, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2012); William George Eckhardt, My 
Lai: An American Tragedy, 68 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 671 (2000); Lieuten-
ant Colonel Christopher T. Fredrikson, Annual Review of Developments in In-
structions, ARMY LAW., May 2011, at 25; Leslie C. Green, Superior Orders and 
Command Responsibility: Fifteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International 
Law, 175 MIL. L. REV. 309, 314–15 (2003); Michael Kenneth Isenman, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 1474 (1990) (reviewing HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE 
HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AU-
THORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY (1989)); Martha Minow, Living Up to Rules: 
Holding Soldiers Responsible for Abusive Conduct and the Dilemma of the Su-
perior Orders Defence, 52 MCGILL L.J. 1 (2007). 
 Simply think-
 178. United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 27 (C.M.A. 1973). 
 179. See id. Recent jury instructions support this individualized assess-
ment. The Army model instructions, for instance, provide that in determining 
whether the defendant knew the order was illegal, the jury must “resolve this 
issue by looking at the situation subjectively, through the eyes of the [defend-
ant]. You should consider the [defendant’s] (age) (education) (training) (rank) 
(background) (experience).” U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-9, MILITARY JUDGES’ 
BENCHBOOK § 5-8-1 (1 Jan. 2010) [hereinafter MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCH-
BOOK]. 
 180.  
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an of-
fense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the 
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that na-
ture or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves 
a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that 
his conduct will cause such a result. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). 
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ing the order may be unlawful would not be sufficient to satisfy 
the standard.  
The objective requirement turns out not to be as straight-
forward. On its face, it simply requires that the order be mani-
festly illegal to a person of common understanding.181 But it is 
not exactly clear how to define “manifestly illegal” or “person of 
common understanding.” As to the latter, what constitutes this 
hypothetical person? Should a military soldier’s individualized 
experience or training be included? What about a soldier’s rank 
or age? Currently, the answer seems to be a bare-bones hypo-
thetical soldier with little to no individualization.182 But as evi-
denced by the dissent in Calley, there does seem to be some de-
bate as to how much individualization should be included when 
constructing this objective standard.183
Scholars, too, have taken up this issue.
  
184 Professor Mark 
Osiel, for instance, questions the efficacy of the prevailing non-
individualized model. He recognizes that the test focuses on a 
person of “common conscience of elementary humanity,” such 
that the illegality of the act would be “universally known to 
everybody.”185 However, he argues that such a general state-
ment fails to take into account the individual “strengths and 
weaknesses” of a particular defendant.186 He advocates instead 
for incorporating some of the defendant’s characteristics before 
applying the rule.187 This may help ameliorate a soldier’s com-
peting duties of obeying orders on the one hand but disobeying 
orders that are unlawful on the other.188
This issue is not new. Courts and scholars have always 
struggled with how individualized objective scrutiny should be 
when it comes to defenses in the criminal law. For example, 
significant ink has been spent on how individualized the objec-
  
 
 181. See supra Part I.D and note 128. 
 182. See supra Part I.D and note 128. Military jury instructions support 
this bare-bones approach. The Army model instructions, for instance, simply 
ask for details about the terms of the order when discussing whether a person 
of common understanding would have known the order to be illegal. MILITARY 
JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 179, § 5-8-1. 
 183. See supra Part I.D. 
 184. See generally supra Part I.D. 
 185. Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the 
Law of War, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 939, 975 (1998) (quoting DINSTEIN, supra note 
93, at 15).  
 186. Id. He finds that civilian law affords greater individualization than 
military law. Id.  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1091. 
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tive reasonable-person standard should be when it comes to 
criminal defenses such as self-defense or heat of passion (e.g., 
to what extent gender, specific cultural beliefs, prior experi-
ence, and idiosyncratic characteristics should be included).189 
The more narrowly one defines the reasonable person or person 
of common understanding as possessing the subjective qualities 
of the defendant, the more likely the defendant will be success-
ful in raising the defense.190
 
 189. See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986) (discussing im-
pact of race-based experience in making objective determination of reasonable 
person standard in self-defense); Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1990) (discussing whether provocation based on viewing homosexu-
al lovemaking should be included in reasonable person standard when it 
comes to heat-of-passion defense for murder); Joshua Dressler, When “Hetero-
sexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual 
Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
726 (1995); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Norma-
tive Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996) (discussing the 
relevance of race-based beliefs in constructing the reasonable person standard 
in self-defense cases); Robert L. Misner, The Awkward Case of Harry Gibson, 
1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 691, 692–93 (discussing whether cultural beliefs should be 
included in the reasonable person standard when it comes to heat-of-passion 
defense for murder); Victoria Nourse, After the Reasonable Man: Getting Over 
the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 33 (2008) (discuss-
ing the nature of the objective standard in self-defense); Robbin S. Ogle, Dan-
iel Maier-Katkin & Thomas J. Bernard, A Theory of Homicidal Behavior 
Among Women, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 173 (1995) (discussing how a “reasonable 
woman” may react differently than a “reasonable man” when in the heat of 
passion); Laurie J. Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-
Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 
1679–81 (1986) (discussing the implications of using gender in the reasonable 
person standard for the heat-of-passion defense to murder given the finding 
that women tend to respond to stressful situations by feeling guilt rather than 
externalizing anger); see also Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable 
Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137 (2008) (discussing the extent 
of the individualization of the reasonable person standard in criminal cases). 
  
 190. That said, a certain level of individualization over and above the basic 
“reasonable person” standard could have the opposite effect. See Taylor, supra 
note 189, at 167–81 (noting that if women in stressed situations are less likely 
to externalize the anger through violence, a woman defendant raising a heat-
of-passion defense may not be as successful if the objective standard includes 
gender). Similarly, with a more individualized definition of “person of common 
understanding,” a solider may not be successful in raising an obedience to or-
ders defense. 
Imagine an experienced and high-ranked soldier who is given an unlawful 
order to bomb a particular facility. Assuming she does not know it is unlawful, 
it may turn out that a person of common understanding, without the relevant 
experience or training, would not recognize the order to be unlawful. However, 
a more individualized hypothetical high-ranking officer may have known the 
order was unlawful, thus resulting in conviction.  
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Similar, and perhaps greater, issues arise with how to de-
fine palpable or manifest illegality. The focus is on whether a 
solider would find the order illegal “at first blush.”191 One early 
court decision puts it this way: an order is manifestly illegal if 
it is “so palpably atrocious as well as illegal, that one must in-
stinctively feel that it ought not to be obeyed.”192 Likewise, 
scholars have characterized it as a soldier’s “gut-level, unrea-
soning” and have focused on whether the order invokes “repug-
nance” or “moral opprobrium.”193 The standard seems easy to 
apply when breaking the law has nothing to do with purported 
military objectives. For instance, an order by a superior officer 
to rape a person would obviously be manifestly illegal.194 The 
same would be the case for an order to execute unarmed civil-
ians.195
But the analysis becomes more difficult when the act is ar-
guably connected to military service. Osiel takes the example of 
a soldier shooting prisoners.
 These are easy cases for the standard, particularly be-
cause there is seemingly no military purpose for these acts.  
196 At first blush, this would seem 
like an unlawful act that is manifestly illegal. But other consid-
erations may bear on whether the soldier has committed a 
crime. Perhaps military necessity would permit a small group 
of soldiers, who are vulnerable and behind enemy lines, to kill 
these individuals if they could not take them as prisoners of 
war without jeopardizing an important mission.197 It is not clear 
how the concept of manifest illegality would handle this type of 
situation. Osiel finds that the principle’s bright-line rule fails to 
account for the situational awareness of circumstances that 
may make the same act unlawful in one context but not in the 
other.198
He goes on to argue that certain acts, while manifestly ille-
gal, may be necessary evils for achieving the greater good.
  
199 He 
uses the example of the Hiroshima bombing, which killed thou-
sands of innocent civilians.200
 
 191. McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 1240 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867). 
 Would a soldier be punished for 
following orders to drop the atom bomb? Under a strict reading 
 192. Id. at 1241. 
 193. Osiel, supra note 185, at 995. 
 194. See id. at 1003. 
 195. See discussion of Nuremberg Charter, supra Part I.C. 
 196. See Osiel, supra note 185, at 1003–05. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 971. 
 199. Id. at 989–90. 
 200. Id. 
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of the manifest illegality principle, the answer seems to be yes. 
Surely, such an act would be, “at first blush,” clearly illegal and 
morally repugnant. But utilitarian principles suggest other-
wise. Indeed, the conventional thinking was that such an act 
would end the War early and save many more lives than it 
took.201 Another consideration relates to the appropriate legal 
perspective—international or national—from which the illegali-
ty standard should apply.202 Certain acts that are blanketly il-
legal under international law may not be illegal under national 
law and vice versa.203
These are interesting issues that merit further discussion. 
To be sure, any account of this objective state-of-mind standard 
must satisfactorily define what constitutes “manifest illegality” 
and “person of common understanding.” However, these ques-
tions are ultimately beyond the scope of this article. The pur-
pose here is not to debate how to define the prevailing model, 
but to question why it is used in the first place. In fact, if the 
manifest illegality principle is subject to such varying interpre-
tations, one must ask why it is part of the defense and what 
role it really serves.  
  
B. THE UNIQUE CASE OF OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS  
The first place to start is the rationale for the defense it-
self. An obedience to orders defense serves to balance compet-
ing interests. We want to make sure soldiers do not commit 
crimes, but we also recognize that military life requires soldiers 
to obey orders. As one early case notes, “implicit obedience 
which military men usually pay to the orders of their superi-
ors . . . is indispensably necessary to every military system,” 
but “the[se] instructions cannot . . . legalize an act which . . . 
would have been a plain trespass.”204
 
 201. Id. at 990. For a discussion of the justification for the bombing, see 
WILLIAM L. O’NEILL, A DEMOCRACY AT WAR 420–26 (1993) and RONALD 
SCHAFFER, WINGS OF JUDGMENT 131–38 (1985).  
 Scholars also recognize 
the balance that must be reached between these two ends. Pro-
 202. Osiel, supra note 185, at 981–85; see DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 32–
33 (noting that the uncertainty relating to international law pushes against 
the effectiveness of a manifest illegality principle).  
 203. Osiel gives the example of attacking or bombing a medical facility. 
Osiel, supra note 185, at 986–87. Under applicable international law, such de-
stroying a legitimate medical facility is forbidden, but utilitarian considera-
tions of military necessity may trump the international law and render such 
destruction acceptable as collateral damage. Id. 
 204. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804). 
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fessor Yoram Dinstein describes a soldier’s dilemma in this 
way: by submitting to an illegal order, the solider “commits a 
crime [and] violat[es] the prescriptions of criminal law,” but 
should the solider “def[y] the order and abstain[] from commis-
sion of the crime,” he would violate the “dictates of military 
law.”205 The manifest illegality principle seeks to assuage these 
opposing concerns. James Insco describes this principle as a 
“compromise that balances these competing aims by promoting 
discipline in the military while not entirely subverting the su-
premacy of the law.”206 For this reason, the manifest illegality 
principle presumptively favors obeying the order. The language 
requires obedience unless the order is manifestly illegal.207 In 
this way, “[t]he doctrine demands that the subordinate share 
responsibility with his superior only for the clearest, most obvi-
ous crimes.”208
But it is not clear why the standard requires subjective 
good faith (whether the defendant knew the order was unlaw-
ful) along with objective scrutiny of this assessment (whether a 
person of common understanding would have known the order 
was unlawful). The early cases do not explain where the objec-
tive component comes from and why both requirements appro-
priately balance the competing interests of promoting disci-
pline, on the one hand, and making sure no crime is committed, 
on the other. Therefore, Osiel favors an objective standard that 
is less bright-line-based than the manifest illegality principle.
  
209 
He proposes a standard that is more context-based and focuses 
on whether the particular soldier in the given circumstances 
made a reasonable mistake in obeying an unlawful order.210
 
 205. DINSTEIN, supra note 
  
113, at 6–7. 
 206. Insco, supra note 6, at 393. Because of this, Insco describes the de-
fense as “a sort of golden mean.” Id. Courts take a similar approach to the jus-
tification of the objective standard. See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 
32 (C.M.A. 1973) (“Casting the defense of obedience to orders solely in subjec-
tive terms of mens rea would operate practically to abrogate those objective 
restraints which are essential to functioning rules of war.” (quoting United 
States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1184 (C.M.A. 1973))). 
 207. See OSIEL, supra note 101 at 54–55; supra Part I.E.1 and note 128. 
 208. Osiel, supra note 185, at 963.  
 209. Id. at 1091–92. 
 210. Id. This approach begins with the stringent rule that all orders should 
be obeyed. Id. This bright line would be qualified by an exception concerning 
the soldier’s reasonable mistake as to the lawfulness of the order based on the 
“factual configuration confronted by the errant soldier.” Id. Presumably, in as-
sessing whether the error was reasonable, a court would also look at the sol-
dier’s particular experience, training, and rank. Id. at 975 n.121. 
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Dinstein, on the other hand, suggests that a subjective 
standard standing alone would satisfy the competing concerns 
of preventing crimes while fostering military obedience.211 Ar-
guing that subjective knowledge is the key consideration here, 
he finds that the objective standard’s role is simply that of a 
“technical contrivance of the law of evidence, designed to ease 
the burden of proof lying on the prosecution.”212 He finds that 
the uncertainty of the provisions of international law further 
frustrates the use of the objective standard.213 For this reason, 
he advocates for a model that simply focuses on whether the de-
fendant knew the order was unlawful.214 The Model Penal Code 
also supports a purely subjective model.215
Interestingly, none of these accounts ground their proposed 
framework on existing criminal law principles that support re-
jection of the dual state-of-mind requirements.
  
216 Rather, they 
simply argue that their respective approaches balance the com-
peting interests involved, while avoiding the problems associat-
ed with the manifestly illegality standard.217
 
 211. DINSTEIN, supra note 
 This Article goes 
further by relying on the framework of an established de-
113. This type of model would be not unlike oth-
er parts of the criminal law where a jury would infer a subjective state of mind 
from external evidence. See id. at 27–29. This type of model would alleviate 
the issues surrounding the individualization of a “person of ordinary under-
standing” and the definition of “manifestly illegal.” Id. at 27. 
 212. See id. at 29. Dinstein’s criticism of the manifest illegality principle 
appears to echo that of Calley’s dissent. Dinstein too finds that this principle 
may be overinclusive and may result in the improper conviction of a solider 
based on his particular situation. Id. at 27–29. He cites to a solider with a 
subnormal IQ who may not realize an order is unlawful even though a person 
of common understanding would recognize it as such. Id. at 27.  
 213. See supra note 202.  
 214. DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 30–32. Deemed the “personal knowledge 
principle,” Dinstein finds that manifest illegality may still play an ancillary 
role in his model in that if an order was manifestly illegal, the defendant is 
presumed to have been aware of the illegality. Id. 
 215. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10 (1962) (“It is an affirmative defense 
that the actor, in engaging in the conduct charged to constitute an offense, 
does no more than execute an order of his superior in the armed services that 
he does not know to be unlawful.”). The rationale behind this subjective ap-
proach relates to soldiers being prosecuted in civilian jurisdictions where it is 
not realistic for juries to understand what a soldier of common understanding 
would have known. See id. § 2.10 cmt. 1, at 392.  
 216. Some scholars rely on the tort principle of respondeat superior in ar-
guing that the superior officer alone should be held solely responsible for the 
subordinate’s crime. See Nico Keijzer, A Plea for the Defence of Superior Or-
ders, 8 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 78, 80–84 (1978). 
 217. See supra notes 212–15. 
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fense—the entrapment defense—to support rejection of the cur-
rent model.  
The basic problem is that courts and scholars alike have 
failed to accurately analogize obedience to orders to a compara-
ble civilian criminal law defense. Most civilian criminal law de-
fenses—e.g. self-defense, heat of passion, duress, necessity, and 
mistake of law or fact—carry similar dual state-of-mind re-
quirements.218 This may explain why these requirements also 
found their way into the obedience to orders defense. The dis-
sent in Calley, for instance, in arguing for a specific objective 
standard for obedience to orders, noted that objectively scruti-
nizing the defendant’s state of mind is commonly performed in 
other areas of criminal law, citing specifically to the heat of 
passion defense and the mistake of fact defense.219
The obedience to orders defense has been specifically asso-
ciated with the civilian defenses of duress and mistake of law.
 
220
 
 218. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) (noting that self-defense exonerates defendant only if she acted in good 
faith and her belief was “objectively reasonable in light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances”); Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977, 979 (Alaska 1979) (finding that 
necessity requires subjective belief in preventing the greater evil and that the 
belief was reasonable to a person in the defendant’s situation); People v. Na-
varro, 99 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 11 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1979) (finding 
that mistake of fact in general intent crimes require subjective good faith and 
objective reasonableness); Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 722 (Md. 1991) 
(noting that the heat-of-passion defense requires that the defendant commit-
ted homicide in sudden heat of passion and provocation was “calculated to in-
flame the passion of a reasonable man” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); infra Parts III.A.1 (duress requirements), III.B.1 (mistake of 
law requirements). It is important to note that with obedience to orders, un-
like the bulk of these defenses, the ultimate burden of persuasion still rests 
with the government. See United States v. New, 55 M.J. 95, 113–14 (C.A.A.F. 
2001) (noting the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defense of obedience to orders did not exist); MILITARY JUDGES’ 
BENCHBOOK, supra note 
 
These two more than others have come to be seen as sharing 
similar properties with the obedience to orders defense. But 
this association is inapposite. Obedience to orders involves a 
type of government coercion that is not present with either du-
ress or mistake of law. The unique nature of the government’s 
179, § 5-8-1; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, 
supra note 28, at R.C.M. 916(b)(1). 
 219. See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 31–32 (C.M.A. 1973) 
(Darden, C.J., dissenting). The dissent agrees that while objective scrutiny is 
necessary, much like in other parts of criminal law, the standard must be 
more relaxed than the prevailing standard of common understanding. See su-
pra Part I.E.1 (providing an extensive overview of the dissent in Calley).  
 220. See infra Parts III.A–B. 
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role in obedience to orders undercuts the rationale that sup-
ports the use of a dual state-of-mind requirement for these oth-
er defenses. The following sections expand on this argument in 
order to show why these two defenses should not serve as the 
relevant civilian analogs to obedience to orders.  
III.  COMPARING OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS WITH DURESS 
AND MISTAKE OF LAW: THE LACK OF GOVERNMENT 
COERCION   
Part III explains why duress and mistake of law should not 
serve as the relevant civilian analogs. It focuses on the fact that 
both these defenses lack the kind of government coercion pre-
sent in the obedience to orders defense. This Part explores the 
duress defense and contrasts the private coercion present there 
with the public coercion found in obedience to orders. Next, it 
discusses mistake of law and highlights how this defense, un-
like obedience to orders, does not implicate any government in-
fluence or pressure.  
A. DURESS 
1. The Role of Objective Scrutiny 
The early cases of duress primarily involved claims of coer-
cion in contractual disputes.221 In one notable case, the Su-
preme Court defined duress as “that degree of constraint or 
danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, 
which is sufficient, in severity or in apprehension, to overcome 
the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness.”222 In anoth-
er, it defined the term as “moral compulsion, such as that pro-
duced by threats to take life or inflict great bodily harm.”223
These early cases foreshadowed the dual state-of-mind re-
quirements for the use of duress to excuse criminal conduct 
based on specific threats. The typical definition of duress re-
quires the following elements: “(1) an immediate threat of 
death or serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear that the 
threat will be carried out, and (3) lack of a reasonable oppor-
 
 
 221. See, e.g., Hartsville Oil Mill v. United States, 271 U.S. 43, 44 (1926); 
Baker v. Morton, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 150, 151–52 (1870); Brown v. Pierce, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 205, 214 (1868). 
 222. Brown, 74 U.S. at 214.  
 223. Morton, 79 U.S. at 158. 
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tunity to escape the threatened harm.”224 Successful application 
of the duress defense to a crime requires both a subjective state 
of mind and some level of objective scrutiny. The defendant 
must in good faith believe he is being threatened to commit the 
crime, and a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation also 
must have been similarly coerced.225 It is important to note that 
the defendant typically satisfies the mens rea of the crime and 
thus knows what he is doing is unlawful.226 However, the de-
fendant is not criminally responsible assuming the threats suf-
ficiently overpower him. The Model Penal Code and the states 
that follow it talk about this in the context of a defendant being 
“coerced in circumstances under which a person of reasonable 
firmness in [the] situation would likewise have been unable to 
resist.”227 As another court states, “[a] defendant’s [subjective] 
fear of death or serious bodily injury is generally insufficient. 
Rather, ‘[t]here must be evidence that the threatened harm was 
present, immediate, or impending.’”228 Jury instructions follow 
this two-part test, requiring that “[t]he defendant engaged in 
the criminal conduct because he was coerced to do so” and that 
“the degree of force used or the degree of threatened use of 
force, was such that a person of reasonable firmness in the de-
fendant’s situation would not have been able to resist it.”229
 
 224. United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798, 802 (9th Cir. 2008); 
see also United States v. Sawyer, 558 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2009). The Model 
Penal Code requires similar elements: 
 The 
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct 
charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by 
the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the 
person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situa-
tion would have been unable to resist. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985). Many states follow the Model Penal 
Code definition and thus require that a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
shoes would have also not resisted. See id. § 2.09 cmt. 4, at 384 n.60 (collecting 
state statutes).  
 225. A defendant would not satisfy the subjective portion if, for instance, 
she committed the crime after receiving threats that she knew were baseless 
or otherwise not coercive. Perhaps, she wanted to commit the crime for other 
reasons but waited until receiving such veiled threats. Here, she was not actu-
ally coerced.  
 226. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 492 (4th ed. 2003); 
Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and 
Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1359–60 (1989). 
 227. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 explanatory note at 367.  
 228. Sawyer, 558 F.3d at 711; PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 7TH CIRCUIT  
§ 6.08 committee cmt. (2013). 
 229. 5 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS  
§ 6.5 (4th ed. 2007).  
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military defense of duress tracks the same requirements as the 
civilian version, including objectively scrutinizing the defend-
ant’s actions.230
Both courts and scholars have found that the purpose of 
this objective scrutiny is to set uniform standards for all citi-
zens. The Model Penal Code commentary justifies it along the 
following lines:  
  
The crucial reason [for rejecting a wholly subjective approach to du-
ress] is the same as that which elsewhere leads to an unwillingness to 
vary legal norms with the individual’s capacity to meet the standards 
they prescribe . . . . To make liability depend upon the fortitude of any 
given actor would be no less impractical or otherwise impolitic than to 
permit it to depend upon such other variables as intelligence or clari-
ty of judgment, suggestibility or moral insight.231
The point here is that all individuals should be held to a 
certain societal norm notwithstanding a person’s idiosyncratic 
traits.
 
232 The Code mentions the situation of a defendant who is 
easily intimidated and therefore cannot control her conduct.233 
In rejecting the duress defense here, the Code finds that “legal 
norms and sanctions operate not only at the moment of climac-
tic choice, but also in the fashioning of values and of charac-
ter.”234 Courts similarly have focused on the promotion of com-
munity standards as a reason to continue employing objective 
scrutiny.235
Scholars, too, have recognized the importance of holding 
everyone to the same standard. Professor Laurie Doré finds 
that “the normative component of duress excuses only those ac-
tors who demonstrate the level of fortitude that society can fair-
 
 
 230. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at R.C.M. 916(h) 
(“It is a defense to any offense except killing an innocent person that the ac-
cused’s participation in the offense was caused by a reasonable apprehension 
that the accused or another innocent person would be immediately killed or 
would immediately suffer serious bodily injury if the accused did not commit 
the act. The apprehension must reasonably continue throughout the commis-
sion of the act.”). 
 231. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 374. 
 232. The Code, however, does take into account the defendant’s physical 
characteristics: “Stark, tangible factors that differentiate the actor from an-
other, like his size, strength, age, or health, would be considered in making the 
exculpatory judgment. [However,] [m]atters of temperament would not.” 
Id.§ 2.09 cmt. 3, at 375.  
 233. Id. § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 374–75. 
 234. Id. The Code explicitly allows consideration of a “mental disease or 
defect” that is “both gross and verifiable.” Id.  
 235. See, e.g., State v. Heinemann, 920 A.2d 278, 287–89 (Conn. 2007); 
State v. B.H., 870 A.2d 273, 286 (N.J. 2005). 
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ly expect of its morally responsible members . . . . regardless of 
[their] own capacities or constitutional weaknesses.”236 Profes-
sor Joshua Dressler takes a softer approach. While he recogniz-
es that a defendant under duress may not be infallible, he nev-
ertheless concludes that it is acceptable for society to “set 
reasonable, minimal standards of personal responsibility 
(standards to which, lest we forget, we are willing to be held 
ourselves), codify them in our criminal codes, and punish those 
who fail to live up to them.”237
2. Obedience to Orders as a Defense of Duress 
  
Obedience to orders and duress share similar qualities. 
Both defenses involve a third party exerting pressure or coer-
cion on a defendant to commit a crime. The level of pressure 
obviously is different. In one, the coercion takes the form of 
imminent bodily harm or injury. In the other, the threat is im-
plied and takes the form of criminal punishment. If a solider 
fails to obey a superior order, she can be criminally prosecut-
ed.238 It may be an obvious point, but superior officers typically 
do not explicitly convey the threat of prosecution. Rather, sol-
diers are indoctrinated to obey orders as part of their military 
training.239
 
 236. Laurie Kratky Doré, Downward Adjustment and the Slippery Slope: 
The Use of Duress in Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 748 
(1995). Similar reasoning applies to other defenses where objective scrutiny is 
required. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympa-
thetic But Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasona-
bleness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 4–5 (1998) 
(noting that the reasonable person standard in self-defense and heat-of-
passion cases is intended to hold all citizens to the same standard). 
 Evidence in fact suggests that soldiers get very little 
instruction on the obedience to orders defense and the standard 
 237. Dressler, supra note 226, at 1370. 
 238. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at art. 90(2) 
(“[A] [soldier who] willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior com-
missioned officer; shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, 
by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, and if the 
offense is committed at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, 
as a court-martial may direct.”). This type of coercion would still be different 
than traditional duress since the threat of death is not “imminent.” See supra 
note 224 and accompanying text. 
 239. See Jeanne L. Bakker, The Defense of Obedience to Superior Orders: 
The Mens Rea Requirement, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 61 (1989) (“[A] soldier’s 
training will very largely consist of a process designed to inculcate within him 
habits of obedience to command.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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that courts use to judge their actions.240 The end result is a sys-
tem where soldiers are generally expected to obey all orders.241
For this reason, courts naturally seem to characterize obe-
dience to orders as a type of coercion. They talk about the “im-
plicit obedience” or “general duty” associated with superior or-
ders.
  
242 For instance, one court explained that “[t]he first duty 
of a soldier is obedience, and without this there can be neither 
discipline nor efficiency in an army.”243 Pointing out the value of 
reflexive obedience, the court stated that “[i]f every subordi-
nate . . . soldier were at liberty to question the legality of the 
orders of the commander, and obey them or not as they may 
consider them valid or invalid . . . the precious moment for ac-
tion would be wasted in wordy conflicts between the advocates 
of conflicting opinions.”244
Scholars have also come to associate obedience to orders 
with a type of duress. Insco finds that “the defense of superior 
orders . . . embodies the principles underlying the defense[] of 
compulsion.”
  
245 Much like a case of duress, the “soldier must 
make a choice of evils, deciding whether to follow an order, 
which if illegal will subject him to liability, or to defy the order, 
which if legal will subject the soldier to liability for insubordi-
nation.”246
 
 240. Osiel notes that: 
 Dinstein explains that the “factor of compulsion” in 
It may also be possible to induce disobedience to a still wider range of 
unlawful orders by not informing the soldier that reasonable belief in 
their legality will excuse his compliance. Training material issued to 
American soldiers during Operation Desert Storm did just this, de-
scribing their legal duties as more demanding than they actually 
were. The superior orders defense went unmentioned, as if it did not 
exist; and soldiers were expressly instructed: “Orders Are Not a De-
fense.” 
Osiel, supra note 185, at 1096.  
 241. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 51 (“Military discipline is very 
strict, and it threatens insubordination with inexorable sanctions, so that the 
soldier has practically no alternative (especially, though not necessarily, in 
times of war) . . . .”). But see Bakker, supra note 239, at 62 (“Officials are ex-
pected to ask questions of their superiors, and to be morally and legally re-
sponsible for their own actions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 242. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (“[I]mplicit 
obedience which military men usually pay to the orders of their superiors . . . 
is indispensably necessary to every military system . . . .”); see also United 
States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 28 (C.M.A. 1973). 
 243. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 28 (quoting McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 
1240 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867)). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Insco, supra note 6, at 396. 
 246. Id. at 396. But see Bakker, supra note 239, at 62 (“[T]he fact that or-
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an obedience to orders defense can be analogized to the com-
pulsion in a defense of duress.247 Others have made similar 
comparisons.248
This may explain the reason why obedience to orders also 
carries an objective requirement similar to its duress counter-
part.
 
249
The interaction in the duress case is completely between 
private citizens. There is no government control or interest.
 Nevertheless, there is a critical difference between the 
two that goes beyond simply the nature of the coercion in-
volved—i.e., physical threats or threat of criminal sanction. The 
source of the coercion is uniquely different. The government 
plays a key role in pressuring a solider to obey an unlawful or-
der, whereas in the duress scenario, it generally plays no such 
role in pressuring a defendant to accede to an individual’s 
threats.  
250
 
ders are sometimes attended with compulsion does not mean that every case 
of obedience to orders is invariably accompanied by compulsion.”).  
 
As far as the government is concerned, a citizen remains free to 
disregard the threat and not commit the crime. Doing so will 
not result in any criminal sanction or be otherwise deleterious 
to a government objective. Of course, the individual may be 
harmed as a result, but this does not implicate the government 
in the same way. The government no doubt has a general inter-
est in citizens being safe from harm, but a case of duress does 
not implicate specific or targeted government interests as in 
the military situation, where the government is the source of 
the coercion. Objectively scrutinizing the defendant’s state of 
mind on the back end makes sense in a duress case. As dis-
cussed above, the point of this objective test is that citizens 
 247. See DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 77.  
 248. See, e.g., Valerie Epps, The Soldier’s Obligation to Die When Ordered 
to Shoot Civilians or Face Death Himself, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 987 (2003) 
(analyzing the similarities between a soldier’s duty to obey orders and duress); 
Green, supra note 177, at 330–31, 340. 
 249. The level of objective scrutiny is different. Duress takes the perspec-
tive of a “reasonable person,” whereas obedience to orders relies on the lower 
standard of “a man of ordinary sense and understanding.” Compare Calley, 48 
C.M.R. at 27–28, with supra notes 224–29, 231–37 and accompanying text. 
This may be explained by the countervailing concern that soldiers typically 
should obey orders. Having a higher standard here, like that of a “reasonable 
person,” could lead to greater liability for soldiers who are on the lower end of 
the scale or create less respect for obeying orders. Cf. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 28 
(quoting McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 1240 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867)).  
 250. The same would apply to other civilian affirmative defenses men-
tioned earlier (e.g. self-defense and heat-of-passion). The external pressure in 
all of these situations is coming from a private citizen.  
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should all be placed on equal footing if they end up succumbing 
to a private threat of duress and committing a crime. The gov-
ernment cannot realistically keep people from threatening oth-
ers. Uniformity during the trial stage, then, at least prevents 
the government from unfairly discriminating in favor of certain 
individuals because of their specific, idiosyncratic traits. In ad-
dition to providing consistent criminal verdicts, the objective 
standard also serves an important socializing function intended 
to regulate the outer limits of citizens’ behavior.  
This rationale of promoting a uniform standard among sol-
diers—and thus the requirement of objective scrutiny—appears 
problematic in the obedience to orders case. We are not talking 
about behavior among private citizens, where all we can hope 
for is some uniformity after the fact. The government created 
the military command structure in which the subordinate finds 
herself, as well as the criminal sanctions for disobedience to an 
order.251 Thus, through the actions of a commanding officer, the 
government is responsible for the pressure that leads a solider 
to follow an unlawful order and commit a crime.252
One may push back at this and say that the current objec-
tive requirement, as in the duress case, serves an important 
 To be sure, 
without the threat of criminal sanction, the order would not 
have the same coercive effect. Why, then, should a solider be 
subject to additional objective scrutiny targeting her state of 
mind—and an objective requirement which she may not be able 
to satisfy—when the same government prosecuting her is also 
responsible for the coercion? She should not. After all, the sol-
dier is performing a vital function for the government by serv-
ing in its military. The role of government pressure in the 
crime and the resultant standard by which a defendant should 
be judged will be explained more fully in Part IV, discussing 
entrapment. For now, it is enough to say that where the pres-
sure stems from the inherent authority of the order, any objec-
tive consideration should take into account and focus on the 
government’s responsibility in this criminal act, not on what a 
person of common understanding would or would not have 
known. 
 
 251. See generally supra Parts I.A, I.D and accompanying notes.  
 252. Cf. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 423 (1980) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (noting that in the civil context, acts of government employees may 
violate the Eighth Amendment or the government’s duty not to impose cruel 
and unusual punishments); supra Part I.E (overviewing modern obedience to 
order cases). 
  
2014] ENTRAPPED 2143 
 
normalizing function in the military. Holding soldiers to a uni-
form standard helps foster the correct behavior when a subor-
dinate is ultimately confronted with an unlawful order. This 
may be true, but if the duress-based rationale for objective 
scrutiny should apply in the military context, it follows that the 
specific objective requirement itself should also track its duress 
counterpart. It currently does not. Duress focuses on whether a 
reasonable person would have been unable to resist the threat, 
whereas the law of obedience to orders focuses on whether a 
soldier of common understanding would have known the order 
was unlawful.253
Those that liken duress to obedience to orders focus on the 
coercive nature of the threat or order.
 These are two very different questions. The 
first relates to how an individual is expected to behave, where-
as the second relates to what a soldier is expected to know. In 
fact, a successful application of duress is consistent with a de-
fendant knowing that her action constitutes a crime. The point 
of promulgating uniform behavior in this context is to make 
sure individuals act reasonably when confronted with similar 
coercive situations, even if they would know the act is wrongful.  
254 But if this defense in-
deed is the natural civilian analog, then the operative question 
in the obedience to order case must be changed to address the 
nature of the coercion and a soldier’s ability to resist, not 
whether a soldier should have known about the unlawfulness of 
the order. Otherwise, what is the relevance of the pressure be-
ing placed on the soldier? Knowledge of the lawfulness of an 
order seems disconnected from the coercive nature of the or-
der.255
 
 253. The Model Penal Code and the states that follow it clearly ask wheth-
er a reasonable person would have also succumbed to the pressure. See supra 
notes 
 The basic problem in extending the same inquiry is that 
224, 227. The aforementioned federal version and military versions es-
sentially makes the same inquiry, albeit indirectly. The federal rule asks 
whether the belief that the threat would be carried out was reasonable and a 
reasonable person could have escaped or otherwise thwarted the threat. See 
supra Part III.A.1 and accompanying notes. Similarly, the military rule asks 
whether the defendant’s act was caused by a reasonable belief that the threat 
was real. See supra note 230. When the elements of these respective defenses 
are combined, the relevant inquiry becomes whether a reasonable person 
would also have succumbed to the threats or, put slightly differently, whether 
the defendant otherwise acted reasonably. Either way, the focus is on the de-
fendant’s actions, not her knowledge of the criminal nature of the act.  
 254. See supra Part II.B. 
 255. Perhaps the thinking here is that if a soldier knows the order is un-
lawful, she will not follow it. First, this does not necessarily follow given a mil-
itary setting, but, more importantly, any inquiry into knowledge of an order 
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soldiers typically have to follow orders, whereas duress defend-
ants are not obligated to succumb to threats. The reason for the 
difference of course centers on the fact that the government 
promulgates the order in the first situation but not the threats 
in the second. This only underscores the conclusion that the 
government’s role must be accounted for when fashioning the 
obedience to orders defense. Interestingly, the entrapment-
based objective test more appropriately focuses on what a de-
fendant would have done, not what the defendant should have 
known. In its current form, obedience to orders cannot be accu-
rately analogized to the doctrine of duress and its underlying 
rationale.256
None of this changes how we would analyze the defense of 
duress in the military. Take the case of a soldier who threatens 
a subordinate with bodily harm or death unless the individual 
commits a criminal act. Here, the coercion comes from the pri-
vate threat of bodily harm instead of the inherent pressure of a 
superior order (promulgated by the government).
  
257
 
fails to account for the coercion experienced by the soldier, the very factor that 
underlies an application of duress.  
 Because 
there is no government-sanctioned pressure, the defendant 
would simply rely on the conventional duress defense. This 
would look very similar to the civilian analysis described earli-
er. A successful application of duress in this instance would re-
quire some level of objective scrutiny as to the legitimacy of the 
 256. One might argue that obedience to orders should thus be changed to 
more closely resemble duress, as an alternative to this Article’s realignment to 
entrapment. However, this option would require further changes to the obedi-
ence to orders defense. To mirror duress’s subjective element, the subjective 
portion of the obedience to orders defense would have to be changed to ask 
whether a soldier in good faith followed the order, instead of asking whether 
the solider knew the order was unlawful. Compare supra Part III.A.1, with 
supra note 225. This may be problematic in execution, because unlike the co-
ercion facing a duress defendant, soldiers must obey orders. This means the 
soldier would almost always satisfy the subjective or good faith portion of the 
defense.  
More generally, if we have decided to go ahead and change the obedience 
to orders defense, it behooves us to ask if there is a better civilian analog that 
more closely parallels this military defense. This Article argues that entrap-
ment should stand as the civilian equivalent. Because even if as a practical 
matter the revised objective portion of the defense would be similar to either 
duress or entrapment, using the latter fully appreciates the government’s role 
in the crime. See infra Part IV.B. 
 257. See, e.g., MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 179 (noting that 
the obedience to orders defense does not exist if the jury finds beyond reasona-
ble doubt that the defendant “was not acting under orders” when committing 
the crime).  
  
2014] ENTRAPPED 2145 
 
threat. We do not want a different standard by which some sol-
diers are absolved from liability based on such private threats.  
B. MISTAKE OF LAW 
1. The Role of Objective Scrutiny 
Mistake of law historically has not served as a defense to 
criminal conduct.258 Individuals are presumed to know the crim-
inal law, and so ignorance of the specific law is no excuse.259 
The rationale is primarily utilitarian and pragmatic. Not allow-
ing this type of defense deters criminal conduct, fosters orderly 
administration, and preserves the primacy of the rule of law.260 
This absolute prohibition has weakened over time, particularly 
as a result of the proliferation of criminal statutes.261
A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a de-
fense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct 
when . . . [the accused] acts in reasonable reliance [on] an official 
statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or errone-
ous, contained in (i) a statute or other enactment; (ii) a judicial deci-
sion . . . ; (iii) an administrative order . . . ; or (iv) an official interpre-
 Today, 
courts allow a mistake of law defense in limited circumstances. 
The Model Penal Code, for instance, provides a typical formula-
tion:  
 
 258. See, e.g., United States v. Tobin, 480 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2007); Unit-
ed States v. Dean, 487 F.3d 840, 850 (11th Cir. 2007); Howell v. State, 618 So. 
2d 134, 142 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); Kipp v. State, 704 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 
1998); United States v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1068 (N.Y. 1987); Bruce R. 
Grace, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1392, 1395 
(1986) (“The refusal to allow mistakes of criminal law as a defense is due to a 
strong common law presumption that every person knows the criminal law.”).  
 259. See Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake 
of Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 738 (2012) (“The first and 
oldest justification is that ignorance or mistake of the law cannot be an excuse 
since every person is presumed to know the law.”).  
 260. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1080; Meese, supra note 259, at 749 (discuss-
ing the rationales for this rule to include the effective administration of justice 
as well as the promotion of deterrence).  
 261. See Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1074 (“Today there is widespread criticism 
of the common-law rule mandating categorical preclusion of the mistake of law 
defense.” (citing scholars and cases)); Grace, supra note 258, at 1395–96 (not-
ing that the presumption of knowledge of criminal law made sense in the past 
when the “common law of crimes closely tracked a relatively homogeneous 
community’s moral sensibility,” but in light of the increase of regulatory 
crimes, this presumption is “largely fictional”); Meese, supra note 259, at 729–
37 (finding that because of today’s criminal structure, including relevant pro-
cedures and substantive crimes, the rationale for no mistake of law defense 
has been significantly reduced). 
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tation [by the] . . . body charged by law with responsibility for the in-
terpretation . . . .262
Courts have adopted similar requirements.
 
263 In a para-
digmatic case, a defendant, for instance, could make out a mis-
take of law defense to a crime if she relied on an official state-
ment issued by a state Attorney General interpreting a 
relevant criminal provision.264 The defense requires both sub-
jective and objective scrutiny, similar to the requirements of 
duress. The defendant must have actually relied on the infor-
mation in good faith, and the reliance must have been “reason-
able.”265
 
 262. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (1985). The Code also allows the de-
fense where the particular statute is not known to the actor or otherwise not 
reasonably made available. See id. § 2.04(3)(a). A mistake of law defense is al-
so known as estoppel by entrapment, not to be confused with traditional en-
trapment as discussed in Part IV. See Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 
609, 619 (Mass. 1993) (reasonable reliance on a statute or official statement 
creates a defense known as “entrapment by estoppel”); John T. Parry, Culpa-
bility, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 
(1997) (noting that “entrapment by estoppel” signifies reasonable reliance on 
official interpretation of law). A typical rationale for this defense centers on 
the defendant’s reduced culpability because of her reliance on a government’s 
erroneous interpretation of the law. See SueAnn D. Billimack, Reliance on an 
Official Interpretation of the Law: The Defense’s Appropriate Dimensions, 1993 
U. ILL. L. REV. 565, 577. 
 Reasonableness typically means that “a person sincere-
ly desirous of obeying the law would have accepted the 
 263. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 83 (2d Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 947–48 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Clark v. State, 739 
P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska App. 1987); Gallegos v. State, 828 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. 
App. 1992). The military has a similar mistake of law defense in limited cir-
cumstances. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at 
R.C.M. 916(l), Discussion (“[M]istake of law may be a defense when the mis-
take results from reliance on the decision or pronouncement of an authorized 
public official or agency. For example, if an accused, acting on the advice of an 
official responsible for administering benefits that the accused is entitled to 
those benefits, applies for and receives those benefits, the accused may have a 
defense even though the accused was not legally eligible for the benefits.”). 
 264. See, e.g., Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 612–13 (finding that in a prosecu-
tion for involuntary manslaughter for improper care of a child on account of 
spiritual healing, parents could rely on attorney general opinion interpreting 
relevant criminal law).  
 265. See, e.g., United States v. West Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 313 
(3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Bressler, 772 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(noting that a good-faith misunderstanding of law as a defense depends on ob-
jective reasonableness); Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1080–81; State v. Patten, 353 
N.W.2d 30, 33 (N.D. 1984) (holding that even if defendant subjectively relied 
on sheriff’s office and a county state’s attorney statement, the defendant’s al-
leged reliance on such official statements, for the purposes of asserting a mis-
take-of-law defense, was clearly unreasonable). 
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information as true, and would not have been put on notice to 
make further inquiries.”266
Scholars and courts provide two interconnected reasons for 
this reasonableness standard or objective verification. First, it 
is important that there be some objective boundaries so that 
the defense is not dependent on mistaken beliefs of specific in-
dividuals. As Professor Miriam Gur-Arye puts it, “The bounda-
ries ought to be defined by statute and to be interpreted by a 
body empowered to interpret the law . . . [and] should not be in-
fluenced by the mistaken views of each and every individual as 
to the scope of the prohibition.”
 
267 This rationale is similar to 
the rationale for the objective standard in duress. There, too, 
the point is to prevent idiosyncratic verdicts while promoting a 
single community standard. The second justification encour-
ages knowledge of the law and accurate readings of the statute. 
“Granting a defense to a person who relies on a mistaken opin-
ion of an official body . . . helps to promote knowledge of the 
criminal law . . . .”268 It motivates a person to seek guidance on 
verification of the law.269
 
 266. United States v. Lansing, 424 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1970); see also 
United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Nich-
ols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that a belief must be reasona-
ble “in light of the identity of the agent, the point of law misrepresented, and 
the substance of the misrepresentation”). 
 Bruce Grace makes the same point, 
but in the negative. If subjective belief alone were relevant, 
“[t]his could create an incentive for a potential defendant to 
 267. Miriam Gur-Arye, Reliance on a Lawyer’s Mistaken Advice—Should it 
be an Excuse From Criminal Liability?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 458 (2002); 
JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 394, 382–83 (2d ed. 
1960) (“If that plea [mistake of law] were valid, the consequence would be: 
whenever a defendant in a criminal case thought the law was thus and so, he 
is to be treated as though the law were thus and so, i.e. the law actually is thus 
and so. But such a doctrine would contradict the essential requisites of a legal 
system.”); see also Bressler, 772 F.2d at 291 n.2 (providing an objective reason-
ableness instruction helps jury to distinguish good-faith belief from disagree-
ment); Francis Funaro, Tax Law—Assessing Willfulness in Criminal Tax Cas-
es: Supreme Court Rejects Objective Reasonableness Standard—Cheek v. 
United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991), 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 904, 908 (1991).  
 268. Gur-Arye, supra note 267, at 461; United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 
102, 103 (7th Cir. 1987) (limiting the defense to objectively reasonable beliefs 
encourages individual to learn law); cf. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1069 (finding 
that the reason for denying mistake of law defense was the Holmesian utility 
of knowledge principle where individuals should be encouraged to obey the 
law). 
 269. Gur-Arye, supra note 267, at 461.  
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turn a blind eye to the probability of regulation in order to per-
fect a mistake of law defense.”270
2. Obedience to Orders as Mistake of Law Defense 
  
Mistake of law and obedience to orders both deal with reli-
ance on an authoritative interpretation of the law authored by 
the government. In the one, it may take the form of a judicial 
opinion, administrative order, or law enforcement decision. In 
the other, it takes the form of a military order—a pronounce-
ment cloaked with the authority of the government. Much like 
the civilian who trusts the determination of the state attorney 
general, the subordinate soldier trusts the determination of a 
commanding officer. Both these individuals derive their author-
ity to give such statements from the government. This is why 
courts may excuse certain criminal conduct under these cir-
cumstances.271
For this reason, scholars have come to view obedience to 
orders as a version of a mistake of law defense. As Insco writes, 
“Within the framework of an obedience to orders defense, a sol-
dier probably should be able to take refuge in the principles of a 
mistake of law claim . . . .”
 The defendant is relying on the same govern-
ment that is doing the prosecuting.  
272 He gives the example of a com-
manding officer who gives an illegal order to fire on a museum. 
A subordinate soldier following this order accepts (albeit incor-
rectly) the commanding officer’s assessment that this is a law-
ful target.273 Arguably, the reliance here is no different than a 
mistaken reliance on a state attorney general’s official interpre-
tation. Put another way, by asserting an obedience to orders de-
fense, a soldier asserts that “he carried out an illegal order 
while mistaken as to the law involved.”274 Other scholars have 
made similar comparisons.275
 
 270. Grace, supra note 
 
258, at 1416. 
 271. It is important to note that, however, similar to civilian courts, mili-
tary law finds that ignorance of the law is typically not an excuse. MANUAL 
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at R.C.M. 916(l).  
 272. See Insco, supra note 6, at 395.  
 273. Id. Of course, under the obedience to orders defense, the soldier will 
not escape liability if the unlawfulness of the order to burn the museum was 
manifestly illegal.  
 274. See Solis, supra note 80, at 522. 
 275. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 76–77; Hiromi Sato, Mistake of 
Law Within and Outside the International Criminal Court, 15 TOURO INT’L L. 
REV. 138, 158 (2012). Dinstein also explicitly points out how obedience to or-
ders shares qualities of both duress and mistake of law. See DINSTEIN, supra 
note 113, at 56–57.  
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There is indeed a natural nexus between obedience to or-
ders and mistake of law. The element of government authority 
found in both cases is something not present in the duress de-
fense. There, the relevant players are private citizens with no 
connection to the government. For this reason, one might even 
more closely associate obedience to orders with mistake of law 
than with duress.276 But here, too, there is a critical difference. 
There is no coercion in mistake of law cases. A defendant simp-
ly relies on an official interpretation and decides on her own to 
take the relevant course of conduct.277 The action is entirely dis-
cretionary. A defendant, for instance, may seek an interpreta-
tion from the attorney general’s office in connection with per-
formance of some potentially illegal activity. But the defendant 
is not required by the government to take the action.278
Objective scrutiny makes sense in the mistake of law con-
text. As discussed above, it promotes uniformity of standards. 
As in the case of duress, the successful application of the mis-
take of law defense should not depend on the idiosyncratic, 
mistaken beliefs of citizens. It is important to promulgate a 
consistent community standard with respect to reliance on a 
government agency’s recommendation. The same goes for pro-
moting knowledge of the law. With an objective requirement, 
citizens are encouraged to make sure they properly investigate 
 
 
 276. The relevant inquiry in mistake of law also more closely tracks the 
inquiry in obedience to orders. Both mistake of law and obedience to orders 
focus on the defendant’s state of mind and the reasonableness of the belief, 
whereas duress focuses on the defendant’s actions and whether these actions 
are reasonable.  
 277. This type of reliance on official authority was central in the Oliver 
North case. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1990); 
OSIEL, supra note 101, at 301 n.19 (“Oliver North defended his conduct on the 
basis of a Model Penal Code provision applicable to civilians who reasonably 
rely on statements of their legal duties by official authorities.”). 
 278. Another area that has prompted discussions of the mistake of law de-
fense involves actions by non-military government officials in connection with 
the detention and interrogation of terror suspects. See generally John Sifton, 
United States Military and Central Intelligence Agency Personnel Abroad: 
Plugging the Prosecutorial Gaps, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2006). While no 
such non-military government agent has been prosecuted, they could argue 
that they reasonably relied on the Office of Legal Counsel’s memos on the sub-
ject. See id. at 513–14. It is not clear to what extent the arguments in this Ar-
ticle would apply here. These agents presumably would not have been ordered 
to use these alleged torture techniques with threat of criminal sanction as in 
the obedience to orders case. That said, perhaps these individuals would have 
been threatened by demotion or termination, suggesting a reworking similar 
to the instant analysis.  
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and read the official interpretation before acting in accordance 
with it.  
Objective scrutiny, however, does not make sense in the 
obedience to orders case. A soldier does not merely rely, at her 
own discretion, on an official interpretation of the law issued by 
her commanding officer. The soldier is required to obey the 
command. This government-sanctioned coercion has to be ac-
counted for when holding a soldier liable for committing a 
crime under these circumstances. The basic point here tracks 
the earlier discussion of duress and obedience to orders.279 Sol-
diers should not be held to a uniform standard when the very 
government doing the prosecuting is the one coercing them to 
commit the crime.280
The promotion of knowledge of the law as a separate justi-
fication for the requirement of objective scrutiny also does not 
make sense in the military context. The very nature of military 
structure and necessity requires obedience, not investigation.
  
281 
To be sure, a culture where soldiers routinely question the law-
fulness of superior orders would be deleterious to military effec-
tiveness. This is not to suggest that soldiers are merely robots 
following orders blindly.282
 
 279. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 Asking for advice and clarification 
has its place. But the role of questioning is obviously more lim-
ited and circumscribed, and understandably so, in the military 
context than in civilian life.  
 280. Dinstein appears to discount the coercion that distinguishes mistake 
of law from obedience to orders. DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 34–36. He finds 
no real difference between a soldier receiving an order from a commanding of-
ficer and one receiving advice from a military lawyer. Both, according to him, 
fall within the rubric of mistake of law. Id. at 35. While the association be-
tween the two cannot be denied, there is a difference between being ordered to 
do something as opposed to simply relying on advice at one’s discretion. Part 
IV will more closely address the relevance of objective considerations when 
confronted with government pressure. 
 281. See OSIEL, supra note 101, at 289; supra Part III.A.2 and related 
notes.  
 282. See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 26 (C.M.A.1973) (“[T]he 
obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier is a rea-
soning agent, obliged to respond, not as a machine, but as a person.”); Osiel, 
supra note 185, at 1070 (“Informed by military sociology, sophisticated mili-
tary managers increasingly prefer the initiative of the self-starter to the 
blind obedience of the automaton.”). 
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IV.  REALIGNING OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS WITH 
ENTRAPMENT   
Part IV explores the similarities between entrapment and 
obedience to orders and argues that both should share the same 
requirements. This Part first details the history of entrapment 
and the contours of the subjective and objective tests, along 
with scholars’ reactions to them. It next highlights the similari-
ties between the two defenses and explains what a reoriented 
obedience to orders defense would look like. Finally, it provides 
a real-world hypothetical military scenario that applies the 
reconceptualized defense.  
A. CONTOURS OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 
The history of the entrapment defense represents two com-
peting interests: making sure the government has the ability to 
ferret out criminal activity and preventing the government 
from coercing or unlawfully pressuring otherwise innocent citi-
zens to commit crimes.283 The early American cases did not rec-
ognize any defense based on police inducement.284 If a citizen 
committed a crime, regardless of the role of government, she 
was guilty of the crime.285 Shortly after the turn of the century, 
courts became increasingly frustrated with government-
induced crimes committed by citizens.286 They criticized gov-
ernment agents, albeit in dicta, for their overreaching tactics 
and encouragements.287
Federal courts similarly began to emphasize the unfairness 
of punishing government-induced crimes.
 
288
 
 283. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 2, at 408 (1985) (“Particularly in 
the enforcement of laws against vice, such as liquor and narcotics laws, it is all 
but impossible to obtain evidence for prosecution save by the use of decoys.”); 
Lombardo, supra note 
 Woo Wai v. United 
28, at 210–11; cf. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 
210 & n.6 (1966) (acknowledging the importance of decoys in ferreting out cov-
ert criminal dealings). 
 284. See Lombardo, supra note 28, at 218–19 and accompanying notes for 
cases rejecting the defense.  
 285. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1864) (finding that the plea of entrapment “has never since availed to shield 
crime or give indemnity to the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code 
of civilized, not to say christian [sic] ethics, it never will.”). 
 286. See Lombardo, supra note 28, at 219 and accompanying notes. 
 287. See id. at 220–21 and accompanying notes for cited cases; Scott C. Pa-
ton, “The Government Made Me Do It”: A Proposed Approach to Entrapment 
Under Jacobson v. United States, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 997 (1994). 
 288. See Lombardo, supra note 28, at 220–21 and accompanying notes for 
cited cases.  
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States became the first case to allow entrapment as a complete 
defense to the commission of a crime.289 The defendants were 
charged with conspiring to unlawfully bring certain foreign na-
tionals into the country.290 The Ninth Circuit overturned their 
convictions, finding that the evidence adduced at trial involved 
significant government encouragement or inducement to com-
mit the crime.291 Specifically, the court noted that undercover 
agents prodded defendants on numerous occasions over a two-
year period before the defendants finally assented to the crimi-
nal scheme.292
In reaching its conclusion, the court focused on the mental 
state of the defendants. It found that prior to the government 
involvement, the defendants had never engaged in this type of 
illegal importation or “thought of committing any offense 
against immigration laws.”
  
293 Rather, with “the case at bar, the 
suggestion of the criminal act came from the officers of the gov-
ernment.”294 Obtaining a conviction under these circumstances, 
according to the court, was against public policy.295 This deci-
sion led to a number of other federal cases involving claims of 
entrapment.296
It was not until Sorrells v. United States, almost twenty 
years later, that the Supreme Court issued an authoritative 
statement on the entrapment defense.
 
297 The case involved a 
defendant who was convicted of selling whisky in violation of 
the National Prohibition Act.298
 
 289. See Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915); Lombardo, 
supra note 
 The Court overturned the ver-
dict because the trial court failed to allow the defendant to 
28, at 221.  
 290. Woo Wai, 223 F. at 412. 
 291. Id. at 413. 
 292. Id. at 414.  
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 415. 
 295. Id. (“We are of the opinion that it is against public policy to sustain a 
conviction obtained in the manner which is disclosed by the evidence in this 
case, taking the testimony of the defendants to be true, and that a sound pub-
lic policy can be upheld only by denying the criminality of those who are thus 
induced to commit acts which infringe the letter of the criminal statutes.”). 
 296. See generally Annotation, Entrapment to Commit Crime with View to 
Punishment Therefor, 86 A.L.R. 263 (1933). 
 297. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452–53 (1932). 
 298. Id. at 438. The Act was later repealed by the Twenty-First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see also 
Benjamin Grubb, Note, Exorcising the Ghosts of the Past: An Exploration of 
Alcoholic Beverage Regulation in Oklahoma, 37 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 289, 
296–97 (2012) (explaining the adoption of the Twenty-First Amendment).  
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raise an entrapment defense.299 The Court specifically noted 
that the federal agents twice asked the defendant to buy the 
whisky, and twice he refused.300 It was only after the undercov-
er agent appealed to the defendant’s nostalgia for his old World 
War I division, in which both men served, that the defendant 
finally acquiesced and bought the whisky.301
It is clear that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that 
the act for which defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the 
prohibition agent, that it was the creature of his purpose, that de-
fendant had no previous disposition to commit it but was an industri-
ous, law-abiding citizen, and that the agent lured defendant, other-
wise innocent, to its commission by repeated and persistent 
solicitation in which he succeeded by taking advantage of the senti-
ment aroused by reminiscences of their experiences as companions in 
arms in the World War.
 The majority rea-
soned: 
302
The majority, in line with Woo Wai, focused on the state of 
mind of the defendant and the fact that the defendant was oth-
erwise innocent or not predisposed to commit the crime.
 
303 This 
became what is now known as the subjective test used by fed-
eral courts, the military, and the majority of states.304
The concurrence questioned the majority’s focus on the de-
fendant’s subjective intent, finding an internal inconsistency 
with the majority’s reasoning.
  
305
 
 299. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459. 
 On the one hand, the defend-
ant had fulfilled the intent required for the crime, but, on the 
other hand, the defendant was not really guilty because of 
 300. Id. at 439. 
 301. Id. at 440–41; see also Lombardo, supra note 28, at 222 (discussing the 
scenario in which the undercover agent coerced the defendant in Sorrells).  
 302. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441. 
 303. Id. at 443. 
 304. See United States v. Vanzandt, 14 M.J. 332 (C.M.A. 1982) (detailing 
the history of entrapment in the military and the establishment of the subjec-
tive test); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at R.C.M. 
916(g) (“Entrapment. It is a defense that the criminal design or suggestion to 
commit the offense originated in the Government and the accused had no pre-
disposition to commit the offense.”); Lombardo, supra note 28, at 221–24 (not-
ing that the majority of states and federal authorities use subjective entrap-
ment test); Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. REV. 687, 693 
(2010). The typical entrapment situation in the military would involve police 
trying to persuade a soldier to commit a crime. See, e.g., United States v. 
Kemp, 42 M.J. 839 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (finding that defendant was not 
entrapped by undercover Naval Criminal Investigative Service agent). The 
Court’s most recent decision on the subject affirmed the subjective test. See 
Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992) (finding that prosecution 
did not show predisposition in context of multiple year sting operation). 
 305. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453–58. 
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someone else’s conduct.306 To avoid this conceptual difficulty, 
the concurrence instead focused on the role of the government 
in persuading the defendant to commit the crime.307 It suggest-
ed that the entrapment defense embodies a public policy prin-
ciple against crimes “instigated by the government’s own 
agents.”308 This focus on government practices, in lieu of the de-
fendant’s state of mind, would eventually become the objective 
test used in a minority of state jurisdictions.309 The following 
sections expand on these two respective tests.310
 
 306. Id. at 455–56, 459.  
  
 307. Id. at 459. 
 308. Id. at 458–59. The term “government agents” includes federal, state, 
or local law enforcement personnel. See, e.g., United States v. Perl, 584 F.2d 
1316, 1321 n.3 (4th Cir. 1978) (explaining that government involvement in-
cludes “federal, state, or local law enforcement officials or their agents”). But 
the term also includes individuals who may not have official enforcement sta-
tus. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 7, at 418 (1985) (“The defense of en-
trapment does not arise . . . if the inducement comes from a private person 
with no official [government] connection. However, the required connection is 
stated to include many others beside policemen and prosecuting officials.”). 
The basic principle of agency establishes whether a person is acting as a gov-
ernment agent. See, e.g., State v. Ogden, 640 A.2d 6, 11 (Vt. 1993) (explaining 
that a government agent relationship is established within the typical rules of 
agency). This would include informants and other government agents who 
may not have official duties as officers. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 7, 
at 418–19. The military uses a similar definition. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at R.C.M. 916(g), Discussion (“The ‘Govern-
ment’ includes agents of the Government and persons cooperating with them 
(for example, informants).”). 
 309. See Lombardo, supra note 28, at 231–32 (noting that a minority of 
state jurisdictions follow the objective test). The Model Penal Code also en-
dorses the objective entrapment test. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13; see also 
Lombardo, supra note 28, at 232 (discussing the Model Penal Code approach). 
 310. Some states follow a hybrid approach incorporating both tests. See, 
e.g., State v. Florez, 636 A.2d 1040, 1047 (N.J. 1994) (explaining that the 
“statutory defense [of entrapment] has both subjective and objective ele-
ments”); England v. State, 887 S.W.2d 902, 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (hold-
ing that a mixed subjective and objective test is most appropriate in light of 
the entrapment defense statute and caselaw construing it). It is worth noting 
that these tests are different from a constitutional argument against convic-
tion, which would require egregious or overreaching behavior that contravenes 
a person’s due process rights. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 
429–30 (1973); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452. However, this type of constitutional 
violation has a high burden that is rarely successful. See Hampton v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 484, 490–91 (1976); PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DE-
FENSE § 7.01–.08 (4th ed. 2009).  
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1. Subjective Test 
The subjective test for entrapment traditionally carries two 
conceptually distinct factors: inducement and predisposition.311 
The government must have induced the defendant to commit 
the crime, and the defendant must not have been predisposed 
to commit the crime.312 As a threshold requirement, the in-
ducement component is typically easy to satisfy and simply re-
quires a showing that the government in some way encouraged 
or actively participated in the crime.313
The main focus of the subjective test turns on the predispo-
sition of the defendant, or, whether the defendant would have 
committed the crime without government encouragement.
  
314 
Here, the inquiry is squarely centered on the defendant’s state 
of mind.315 It is important to note that this inquiry does not ad-
dress the defendant’s criminal intent.316 This is assumed, be-
cause the entrapped defendant has presumptively satisfied the 
specific mens rea requirements for the criminal act.317
 
 311. See United States v. Whittle, 34 M.J. 206, 208 (C.M.A. 1992) (“The 
first element is generally referred to as the inducement element and the se-
cond as the predisposition element.”); Paton, supra note 
 Never-
theless, the defendant argues she is not culpable because of the 
287, at 1000–01. 
 312. See, e.g., United States v. Larson, 64 M.J. 559 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 
2006); Hardin v. State, 358 N.E.2d 134, 136 (Ind. 1976). The defendant tradi-
tionally has the burden of production in showing some evidence of inducement, 
at which point the burden of persuasion rests on the government to show that 
the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. See, e.g., United States v. 
Theagene, 565 F.3d 911, 918 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Brisbane, 729 F. 
Supp. 2d 99, 113 (D.D.C. 2010); Whittle, 34 M.J. at 208 (noting that the initial 
burden of production is on the defendant but ultimate burden of persuasion of 
showing predisposition rests with the government). The ultimate question of 
whether the defendant was entrapped also typically falls on the jury. PATTERN 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 6.04 (2012 ed.); see 
MARCUS, supra note 310, § 6.04. 
 313. See United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1979) (requiring 
evidence which amounts to “more than a scintilla”); Paton, supra note 287, at 
1001.  
 314. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(“[E]ntrapment raises the issue of whether the criminal intent originated with 
the defendant or with government agents.”); United States v. Clark, 28 M.J. 
401 (C.M.A. 1989). 
 315. See, e.g., People v. Sprouse, 983 P.2d 771, 776 (Colo. 1999). 
 316. See Katrice L. Bridges, Note, The Forgotten Constitutional Right to 
Present a Defense and Its Impact on the Acceptance of Responsibility-
Entrapment Debate, 103 MICH. L. REV. 367, 374–76 (2004). 
 317. See id. 
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lack of predisposition.318 In making this determination, courts 
look at a variety of factors, including the character and reputa-
tion of the defendant, the defendant’s prior criminal record, 
whether the government first suggested the criminal activity, 
whether the defendant engaged in the crime for profit, whether 
the defendant demonstrated a reluctance to commit the offense, 
and the nature of the inducement or persuasion offered by the 
government.319 Probably the most important consideration in 
showing lack of predisposition is the extent to which the de-
fendant was reluctant to commit the crime in the face of gov-
ernment inducement.320 Inducement here includes “excessive 
pressure, threats, or the exploitation of an unfair advantage,” 
but would not include “simple solicitation [or] [e]mpty promises 
that a crime, once committed, will produce no adverse reper-
cussions.”321 This means police “are not precluded from utilizing 
artifice and stealth” as long as “they merely afford opportuni-
ties or facilities for the commission of the offense by one predis-
posed or ready to commit it.”322 Predisposition here may be evi-
denced by the defendant’s enthusiastic participation in the 
crime.323
 
 318. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62 (1988) (“When a defendant 
pleads entrapment, he is asserting that, although he had criminal intent, it 
was ‘the Government’s deception [that implanted] the criminal design in the 
mind of the defendant.’” (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 
(1973))); Bridges, supra note 
  
316, at 373–76 (noting that entrapment does not 
dispute factual guilt). A defendant who claimed she did not know she was 
committing a crime would more appropriately assert a mistake of law defense. 
See supra Part III.B.1. 
 319. United States v. Higham, 98 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1996); People v. 
Kulwin, 593 N.E.2d 717, 719 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
 320. See, e.g., Higham, 98 F.3d at 291; United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 
F.2d 896, 908 (9th Cir. 1993). But see United States v. Meyers, 21 M.J. 1007, 
1014 (A.C.M.R. 1986) (declining to “treat any one factor as on its face being 
more important than any other”). 
 321. United States v. Ramos-Paulino, 488 F.3d 459, 462 (1st Cir. 2007); see 
also Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376–78 (1958) (finding that de-
fendant was entrapped by informant pretending to be recovering addict in 
great suffering to persuade defendant to obtain illegal narcotics for him); 
United States v. Myers, 575 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 322. See United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 902, 909 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 323. United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 126–27 (5th Cir. 1995). It is 
important to note that defendant’s knowledge of the criminality of the act is 
not relevant. It stands to reason that the defendant probably knew what she 
was doing was unlawful, but this knowledge (or lack thereof) is more relevant 
in the mistake of law context. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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2. Objective Test 
The objective test centers on the conduct of the government 
agents instead of the specific state of mind of the defendant.324 
The crucial question under this test is whether the government 
practices were so extreme that they created a substantial risk 
that a law-abiding person would commit the crime.325 It is 
worth noting that “some tactics employing misrepresentation 
and persuasion are necessary to successful police work and 
ought not to be forbidden.”326 For instance, the government can 
set up sting operations where police pose as potential victims or 
co-conspirators.327 The prototypical case would involve govern-
ment agents posing as drug buyers in order to ferret out drug 
suppliers.328 However, these activities cross the line into en-
trapment when the government agents go beyond simply 
providing an opportunity to commit the crime and instead en-
gage in “overbearing conduct such as badgering, cajoling, [or] 
importuning.”329 For instance, repeated invitations and pressur-
ing by government agents to commit a certain crime would 
most likely constitute entrapment.330 Making false representa-
tions that induce someone to believe that the conduct is not 
criminal would also qualify.331 In making this determination, 
“the propensities of the particular defendant are irrelevant.”332
 
 324. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 445–50 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen the 
agents’ involvement in criminal activities goes beyond the mere offering of 
such an opportunity and when their conduct is of a kind that could induce or 
instigate the commission of a crime by one not ready and willing to commit it, 
then regardless of the character or propensities of the particular person in-
duced [entrapment] has occurred.”).  
 
 325. Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska 1969); Commonwealth 
v. Jones, 363 A.2d 1281, 1285 (Pa. 1976); State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). The defendant typically has the burden of persuasion to 
show that a hypothetical law-abiding citizen would have also committed the 
crime. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 5, at 415 (1985); MARCUS, supra 
note 310, § 6.01, .05. The judge, not jury, also typically but not always decides 
whether the defendant was entrapped under this formulation. See Russell, 411 
U.S. at 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Under [the objective approach], the de-
termination of the lawfulness of the Government’s conduct must be made . . . 
by the trial judge, not the jury.”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.09. 
 326. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 2, at 408.  
 327. See, e.g., State v. James, 484 N.W.2d 799, 800–01 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1992). 
 328. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549–50 (1992). 
 329. People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 955 (Cal. 1979).  
 330. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 439–41 (1932); Woo 
Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412, 412–14 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 331. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(a).  
 332. Id. § 2.13 cmt. 3, at 411.  
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The inquiry focuses on the effect of the government’s conduct 
on a normal, law-abiding person in the defendant’s situation.333
As previously mentioned, this objective standard may be 
likened to the objective scrutiny inquiry in the duress defense 
in the sense that both ask about what a reasonable person 
would do in the situation.
 
If the practices would cause this hypothetical person to commit 
the crime, the defendant would be successful in raising an en-
trapment defense. 
334
3. Scholars’ Reactions 
 However, with duress, this element 
functions as a secondary requirement such that the defendant 
must also in good faith be coerced. With entrapment, in a juris-
diction that has adopted the objective test, there is no subjec-
tive requirement. The focus is entirely on the hypothetical per-
son and whether government tactics would have convinced him 
to commit the crime.  
Scholars have pointed out advantages and disadvantages 
to both the subjective and objective tests. A key advantage of 
the subjective test is that it keeps the focus on the defendant.335 
As a result, it punishes only those who would have committed 
the crime regardless of the government’s action.336 Yet some 
have noted that in its attempt to assess the defendant’s guilt, 
the subjective test also inappropriately focuses on a defendant’s 
prior history as relevant to the instant determination.337 This 
may unfairly prejudice the defendant based on her prior con-
duct.338
 
 333. People v. Lee, 219 Cal. App. 3d 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); People v. Al-
ford, 251 N.W.2d 314 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977), aff’d, 275 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. 
1979). This contextual analysis would naturally include the interaction of the 
defendant with the government agent and the defendant’s response to the 
agent’s inducements. See, e.g., Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969); 
Barraza, 591 P.2d at 955.  
 Professor Louis Michael Seidman has also questioned 
whether the subjective test really provides a practically distinct 
 334. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 335. Paton, supra note 287, at 1029.  
 336. Id. 
 337. See Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United 
States: Towards a More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1055, 1066–68 (1993); Andrew H. Costinett, Note, “In a Puff of 
Smoke”: Drug Crime and the Perils of Subjective Entrapment, 48 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1757, 1766–70 (2011). 
 338. Costinett, supra note 337, at 1766–70 (noting the unfair prejudice that 
may arise by examining a defendant’s prior criminal record or bad acts). 
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analysis from the objective standard.339 He argues that because 
predisposition means readiness to commit a crime, the only 
way for courts to ascertain this level of intent is to posit a min-
imum level of inducement by which even an innocent person 
would respond.340 Distinguishing a defendant who is worthy of 
punishment from one who is not will ultimately turn on the 
government’s conduct—the central feature of the objective 
standard.341
Similarly, the objective test garners both positive and neg-
ative reactions. Scholars seem to praise the idea that this test 
eschews any discussion of a defendant’s prior acts and instead 
focuses solely on the government’s action in this particular 
case.
 
342 With its emphasis on government inducement, this test 
also serves to guard against government misconduct in the fu-
ture.343 One major drawback according to some is that the test 
places too much emphasis on what a hypothetical reasonable 
person would do in the defendant’s situation.344 As Scott Paton 
writes, “The concern is that the objective analysis takes place 
in a vacuum of abstractuess [sic] where intangibles battle each 
other.”345
The purpose of this Article is not to debate the merits of 
these two tests. The important takeaway for my argument is 
that neither test carries the dual objective and subjective state-
of-mind requirements found in duress or mistake of law. The 
subjective entrapment defense has a single test that focuses 
solely on what the defendant thought.
  
346
 
 339. See Louis Michael Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and 
Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 118–19 (1981). 
 There is no additional 
 340. See id.; see also Rebecca Roiphe, The Serpent Beguiled Me: A History 
of the Entrapment Defense, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 257, 294–95 (2003) (dis-
cussing Seidman’s argument).  
 341. Seidman, supra note 339, at 118–19; Andrew Carlon, Note, Entrap-
ment, Punishment, and the Sadistic State, 93 VA. L. REV. 1081, 1093–95 
(2007). Perhaps, for this reason, some scholars favor a hybrid approach that 
incorporates features of both tests. See, e.g., Paton, supra note 287, at 1032–
34; Jeffrey N. Klar, Note, The Need for a Dual Approach to Entrapment, 59 
WASH. U. L.Q. 199, 200 n.10 (1981). 
 342. See Paton, supra note 287, at 1030–31. 
 343. See Klar, supra note 341, at 211–12; Paton, supra note 287, at 1030–
31. 
 344. See Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 
216–24 (1976); Klar, supra note 341, at 218. 
 345. See Paton, supra note 287, at 1031.  
 346. See, e.g., Lombardo, supra note 28, at 221–24 (outlining the funda-
mentals of the subjective entrapment defense and tracking its evolution). 
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element of objective scrutiny.347 The objective entrapment test 
also asks only one question—whether the government’s conduct 
was so extreme as to induce a law-abiding person to commit the 
crime. There is no additional analysis or scrutiny of the defend-
ant’s state of mind.348 Whether she is guilty or otherwise pre-
disposed is not relevant.349 While the objective test does incor-
porate a reasonable person standard, the purpose is to evaluate 
the government’s conduct and its effect on this hypothetical 
person, not scrutinize the defendant’s state of mind, as in cases 
of duress or mistake of law.350
4. The Role of Government Pressure in the Crime  
 
The entrapment defense does not share the same dual 
state-of-mind requirements found in the mistake of law or du-
ress defenses.351 This appears to be more than just historical co-
incidence. When the defense was being codified at the turn of 
the last century, the reasonable person standard was already 
being used.352 So courts could have easily incorporated this ob-
jective scrutiny requirement targeting the defendant’s state of 
mind, but chose not to do so. The explanation seems to center 
on the unique role of the government in the entrapment case.353 
Unlike with other criminal law defenses, which typically in-
volve conduct amongst private citizens,354
 
 347. See Paton, supra note 
 in the entrapment 
287, at 1000–02 (emphasizing the fact that in-
dividual predisposition underlies the subjective entrapment analysis). 
 348. See, e.g., Carlon, supra note 341, at 1090. 
 349. See Lombardo, supra note 28, at 229–30. 
 350. See, e.g., Carlon, supra note 341, at 1091 (speaking to the evaluation 
of the hypothetical individual). 
 351. See, e.g., Paton, supra note 287, at 1029–32 (comparing the objective 
and subjective approaches to entrapment and illustrating a lack of dual state-
of-mind requirements in the traditional tests). 
 352. See Roiphe, supra note 340, at 258–59.  
 353. See, e.g., Carlon, supra note 341, at 1099–1102 (suggesting that one of 
entrapment’s traditional underpinnings has been a desire to check state con-
duct). 
 354. Necessity comes to mind as a criminal defense that does not necessari-
ly involve conduct amongst private citizens. Typically a defendant commits a 
crime in order to avert a greater harm caused by natural forces. See, e.g., 
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (noting that necessity in-
volves a “situation where physical forces beyond the actor’s control rendered 
illegal conduct the lesser of two evils”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985). 
Even here, though, courts use a reasonable person standard, which makes 
sense since the government also plays no active role in this crime. See Monu 
Bedi, Excusing Behavior: Reclassifying the Federal Common Law Defenses of 
Duress and Necessity Relying on the Victim’s Role, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 575, 584 (2011) [hereinafter Bedi, Excusing Behavior]. 
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scenario the government is uniquely responsible for causing the 
crime.355
Take the subjective test. The focus is on the defendant’s 
culpability and whether she would have committed the crime 
but for the government’s actions.
  
356 A defendant pressured by 
the government to commit a crime is not as blameworthy as 
someone who was not coerced in any way.357 The reasoning is 
retributive in nature.358 The defendant who is not predisposed 
is not deserving of punishment, whereas one who is predis-
posed should be found guilty.359 Even though the entrapped de-
fendant knew what he was doing was unlawful, it was only the 
government’s conduct that made the former commit the 
crime.360 In this way, the government can be seen as partly cul-
pable for the crime based on its tactics.361
The government or its officials do not suddenly become guilty of the 
crime. This analysis is not rooted in criminal liability but rather intu-
itive notions of culpability. Because the government caused the de-
fendant to commit the crime, the blame for the offense appropriately 
shifts to the government, and the defendant is found not guilty.
 As has been noted: 
362
 
 355. See, e.g., Carlon, supra note 
 
341 at 1083–85 (delineating between “pri-
vate entrapment”—which does not provide a defense—and entrapment by 
state actors). 
 356. Jonathan Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundation of the En-
trapment Defense, 73 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1037 (1987) (“[T]he supporters of the 
culpability rationale assert that, if the offender was predisposed before the in-
ducement, he is culpable despite the encouragement and should therefore be 
punished. Thus the defense relates to the defendant’s ‘normative culpability,’ 
and resembles other defenses of excuse in the criminal law.”). 
 357. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973) (“[T]o determine 
whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the 
trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.” (quoting 
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958))); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 
376 (arguing that the purpose of entrapment is to prevent government from 
taking advantage of the “weaknesses of an innocent party” and trick him or 
her into “committing crimes which he [or she] otherwise would not have at-
tempted”); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932) (noting the 
availability of the entrapment defense to “persons otherwise innocent” who are 
lured by the government to commit the crime).  
 358. Anthony Dillof, Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 827, 845 (2004). 
 359. See Park, supra note 344, at 240 (“Since [the entrapped defendants] 
are less blameworthy, they are less deserving of retributive punishment  
. . . .”). 
 360. See Lombardo, supra note 28, at 234–54 for an extended discussion of 
causation as it relates to government conduct in the entrapment context. 
 361. See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376 (noting that in entrapment cases 
the government “beguiles” the defendant into committing the crime). 
 362. Monu Bedi, Blame It on the Government: A Justification for the Dis-
parate Treatment of Departures Based on Cultural Ties, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 
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To hold otherwise would be unfair to the defendant.  
Some scholars have argued against this principal of re-
duced culpability. The primary thrust here is that “if govern-
ment encouragement truly diminishes individual culpability for 
criminal conduct, then private encouragement should diminish 
culpability as well. But no one argues that the entrapment de-
fense is proper in the case of private encouragement . . . .”363 
There is nothing problematic about this divergent result. 
Again, the difference here is private versus public coercion. 
When the very entity prosecuting the individual causes the 
commission of the crime, a different standard should apply. 
This does not mean that the privately coerced defendant is not 
sympathetic or is otherwise equally as culpable as someone 
who commits the crime without any external threats. To be 
sure, this is what allows this coerced defendant to escape liabil-
ity under a duress defense.364 The point here is that we should 
not subject the entrapped defendant to the same reasonable 
person standard that applies to the duress defendant. This 
gives the government too much advantage given that it is part-
ly culpable in pressuring the defendant to commit the crime. 
One could analogize the reasoning here to the doctrine of un-
just enrichment in the civilian context. This tort requires a per-
son to make another whole if the former unfairly receives a 
benefit at the expense of the latter.365
The objective standard is also grounded in the govern-
ment’s improper role in facilitating the crime, except that this 
time, the focus is on the actions of the government rather than 
the relative culpability of the defendant.
 In the entrapment case, 
by imposing a reasonable person standard on the defendant, 
the government would be unfairly enriched because it would 
receive the benefit of increasing the chance of a obtaining a 
conviction (by requiring the defendant’s state of mind be rea-
sonable) even though it caused the defendant to commit the 
crime. The same considerations are not present with private 
coercion because the actor doing the coercion has no stake in 
the subsequent duress trial.  
366
 
789, 818 (2010) [hereinafter Bedi, Blame It on the Government]. 
 The point here is to 
 363. Carlson, supra note 356, at 1038; see also United States v. Russell, 
411 U.S. 423, 442 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Dillof, supra note 358, at 
845–52. 
 364. See, e.g., Bedi, Blame It on the Government, supra note 362, at 816. 
 365. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 1 (Discussion Draft 2000). 
 366. See Carlson, supra note 356, at 1044–45.  
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deter extreme tactics and strategies by the government, not 
make sure an innocent defendant is exonerated.367 The ra-
tionale is thus utilitarian in nature, not retributive.368 Allowing 
a defendant to escape liability in this circumstance helps deter 
improper government overreach and police instigation.369 To 
foreclose the possibility of an objectivity-based defense would 
thus encourage the continued use of this type of unwanted gov-
ernment coercion. Such behavior also detracts from the gov-
ernment’s proper task of apprehending offenders without any 
encouragement.370 Moreover, “[s]uch tactics spread suspicion in 
the community and can . . . injur[e] . . . the reputation of law 
enforcement institutions . . . .”371
While the objective entrapment test also invokes a reason-
able person construct,
  
372 the perspective and underlying ra-
tionale of this element are quite different than in duress or 
mistake of law. There, the purpose is to promulgate a uniform 
community standard among citizens.373 This is why the objec-
tive test for those defenses asks whether a reasonable person 
would have similarly succumbed to the threats or whether a 
reasonable person would have relied on the interpretation of 
the law.374 On the other hand, the focus in entrapment is on the 
government’s behavior and whether its tactics would have 
caused the hypothetical person to succumb to the pressure.375 In 
turn, the justification centers on deterring inappropriate gov-
ernment tactics so future citizens are not placed in this type of 
compromising situation.376 Establishing uniform societal norms 
is not relevant, unless the norm relates to promoting certain 
behavior by government actors.377
 
 367. See id.  
 This difference makes sense 
because the source of the pressure in the entrapment situation 
 368. See Dillof, supra note 358, at 860–61 (noting that objective tests act 
“as prophylactic devices to inhibit future police conduct”).  
 369. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 1, at 406–07 (1985).  
 370. See id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. See, e.g., Park, supra note 344, at 165–66. 
 373. See, e.g., Parry, supra note 262, at 13–14, 23–24. 
 374. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985) (dealing 
with mistake of law); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (duress). 
 375. See, e.g., Roiphe, supra note 340, at 258–59 (tracking the development 
of the reasonable person standard as it relates to entrapment). 
 376. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 1, at 406–07. 
 377. Lombardo, supra note 28, at 241–43 (examining the tension that is 
sometimes created as a result of the objective test’s singular focus on govern-
ment misconduct). 
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is the government instead of a private citizen, as in mistake of 
law or duress.378
B. THE ENTRAPPED SOLDIER: OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS 
RECONCEPTUALIZED 
 If the point is to prevent these crimes from be-
ing committed, the government no doubt has more control over 
its own agents’ conduct than it has over private citizens with no 
affiliation with the government.  
The obedience to orders defense looks a lot like a case of 
entrapment. Both involve a defendant being coerced or other-
wise pressured by government agents to commit a crime.379 In 
the entrapment situation, the government takes the form of 
undercover police, and the pressure takes the form of induce-
ment through manipulation or cajoling.380 In the military con-
text, the government agent takes the form of a commanding 
soldier, and the coercion takes the form of a military order.381 
This shared direct government involvement sets these defenses 
apart from both mistake of law and duress. In fact, the gov-
ernment pressure is qualitatively greater in the military than 
the civilian context. Not acquiescing to a police officer’s cajoling 
does not carry any adverse consequences, while disobeying a 
military order carries the threat of criminal punishment.382
For instance, both situations are tied up with important 
government objectives. In the entrapment context, police are 
supposed to ferret out criminal activity.
 
This suggests that the rationales and underlying justification 
behind the entrapment model apply with even greater force in 
the obedience to orders context.  
383
 
 378. See, e.g., Carlon, supra note 
 They are expected to 
employ sting operations that entice defendants to commit 
341, at 1083–84 (noting the essential na-
ture of government action in entrapment and the unavailability of a “private 
entrapment” defense). 
 379. Compare supra Part I, with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13. 
 380. See Richard McAdams, The Political Economy of Entrapment, 96 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 107, 110–11 (2005) (discussing the types of under-
cover police operations which might give rise to entrapment scenarios). 
 381. Commanding soldiers would squarely fall under the definition of gov-
ernment agents. See supra note 308. 
 382. Absent fulfillment of a criminal act, no crime has been committed. See 
Lombardo, supra note 28, at 219–24 for a discussion of the development of 
causation analysis—including the fundamental act requirement—in the en-
trapment context. See supra Part II.B. 
 383. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (recognizing the 
state’s legitimate role in interdicting criminal activity through undercover 
means). 
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crimes.384 But the police cross the line when they engage in ex-
treme tactics and pressure.385 Similarly, lawful orders are part 
and parcel of an effective military regime.386 Subordinates are 
fully expected to follow lawful orders issued by their superi-
ors.387 But this activity crosses the line when soldiers give un-
lawful orders, pressuring subordinates to commit crimes.388
Accordingly, for both doctrinal and policy-related reasons, 
it seems inconsistent for military courts to apply the dual state-
of-mind requirements in obedience to orders cases, in line with 
mistake of law and duress, while the same courts apply a sepa-
rate test for entrapment. Given the similarities in form and 
function as well as the underlying rationales, the contours of 
the obedience to orders defense should more closely resemble 
those of entrapment.
 
Both defenses serve to regulate these competing concerns.  
389
This Article does not necessarily take a position on which 
test—objective or subjective—should be used in the obedience 
to orders case. It stands to reason that the subjective probably 
would be the favored test, as the military version of entrapment 
uses a subjective test.
  
390
 
 384. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549–50 (1992) (reaffirm-
ing the government’s ability to conduct sting operations). 
 Either test provides a narrowly tai-
 385. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 1, at 406 (1985). 
 386. See generally supra Part III.A.2. 
 387. See, e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892 
(2012). 
 388. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that subordinates are 
obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors. Id. 
 389. One might also draw a parallel between obedience to orders and the 
relatively obscure civilian defense of assisting an unlawful arrest. Under this 
defense, a private citizen can defend against assault or related charges when 
this person “is summoned by a peace officer to assist in effecting an unlawful 
arrest . . . .” MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(4). Courts typically require that the 
individual believe the arrest is lawful, or at minimum not believe that the ar-
rest is unlawful, before this defense applies. See id. cmt. 5 & n.40, at 127 (col-
lecting statutes focusing on the subjective belief of the private citizen from 
various jurisdictions). Because this defense only applies when a crime is com-
mitted in the unique context of assisting a police officer in an arrest (i.e., the 
crime committed is collateral to the assistance given to the officer) the focus 
here has been to use entrapment, which, like obedience to orders, broadly ap-
plies to any situation involving government coercion where a defendant is di-
rectly pressured to commit the target crime. For further discussion of this lit-
tle-used defense and its relation to entrapment, see generally Craig Hemmens 
& Daniel Levin, ‘Not a Law at All’: A Call for a Return to the Common Law 
Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 1 (1999). Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that this defense, like entrapment, also does not carry an objec-
tive scrutiny requirement—further bolstering the instant argument.  
 390. It stands to reason that that the subjective test would be the favored 
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lored defense that appropriately recognizes the government’s 
role in the crime and accounts for its behavior.391
The subjective test would focus on a soldier’s state of mind 
and ask whether the soldier was otherwise predisposed to 
commit the act. This inquiry assumes that the soldier satisfies 
the mens rea of the crime, but because of the government’s role, 
the soldier is nevertheless not culpable.
 This reconcep-
tualization also serves to balance the competing concerns of fos-
tering military discipline, on the one hand, and upholding the 
supremacy of the law, on the other.  
392 The operative ques-
tion of predisposition is a little tricky in the military context. 
The point here is to ask whether the defendant would likely 
have committed the crime but for the government coercion. But 
in the military context, the subordinate would most likely have 
done nothing if the order had not been given.393 Soldiers are not 
supposed to take action on their own accord.394 Military struc-
ture—contrary to civilian life—fosters obedience, not independ-
ence.395 However, predisposition can still work as a viable 
standard.396
 
method, as the military version of entrapment uses a subjective test. See 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 
 Courts could look at a variety of factors: the eager-
28, at R.C.M. 916(h). 
 391. The current procedural requirements regarding burden of persuasion 
and jury question should remain the same. The subjective test poses no prob-
lem. It, too, puts the burden of persuasion on the government and requires 
that the jury find that the defendant was otherwise predisposed to commit the 
crime. See supra note 312. However, with the objective test, the burden is typ-
ically on the defendant, and the judge makes a determination as to the success 
of the defense. See supra note 325. Keeping the current procedural posture 
where the government bears the burden does not take away from my argu-
ment. My focus is on adopting the substantive elements of the entrapment de-
fense, not its procedural idiosyncrasies.  
 392. Typically, crimes under the Uniform Code of Military Justice include 
an element that the offense was committed unlawfully or wrongfully, which 
would contemplate a soldier raising the obedience to orders defense. See, e.g., 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at arts. 118(b), (c)(1) 
(murder), 121(b)(1), (d) (larceny). I use the term mens rea to identify the spe-
cific mental state relevant to the crime (e.g., “intends to kill,” “takes, obtains, 
withholds . . . from the possession of the owner”) not the overall lawfulness or 
unlawfulness of the act. See id. at arts. 118(a), 121(a).   
 393. Causation being, of course, of central importance to entrapment. See 
generally Lombardo, supra note 28. 
 394. The fundamental nature of this precept was demonstrated by criticism 
of the United States Army’s relatively short-lived “An Army of One” advertis-
ing slogan. See, e.g., E. KELLY TAYLOR, AMERICA’S ARMY AND THE LANGUAGE 
OF GRUNTS 23 (2010). 
 395. See generally supra Part III.A.2. 
 396. It may turn out that knowledge of the unlawful order remains easier 
to assess. Keeping the current subjective element—i.e., whether the solider 
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ness or reluctance of the soldier to obey the order, the soldier’s 
prior history of taking this type of action, and whether the sol-
dier at any point suggested taking the action. Combined, these 
factors can point to a soldier who was otherwise inclined to 
take the unlawful action.397
This formulation also tracks the subjective entrapment 
test’s emphasis on relative or reduced culpability. The defend-
ant is not guilty, because the government—this time, through 
the acts of its military soldiers—is partly culpable for the com-
mission of the crime. It created the situation and circumstances 
under which the subordinate soldier followed the unlawful or-
der. As in the entrapment case, the focus is on retributive no-
tions of punishment. Because the soldier was not wholly re-
sponsible for the act on account of her following orders, she 
should not be responsible. The aforementioned unjust enrich-
ment argument, in fact, applies with even greater force in the 
obedience to orders context.
  
398 Unlike in the civilian context—
where prosecutorial discretion does not reside with the gov-
ernment agents who have entrapped the defendant—
prosecutorial discretion in the military resides with the very 
command structure from which the unlawful order promul-
gates.399
 
knew the order was unlawful—is not necessarily problematic for my argu-
ment. As long as the inquiry is focused on the defendant’s state of mind—and 
there is no secondary objective scrutiny assessment—the spirit of the subjec-
tive entrapment test remains intact, and it can still serve as the appropriate 
civilian analog. Given the unique nature of military orders versus government 
inducement, this slight difference may be necessary.  
 Furthermore, it seems particularly unfair to allow 
 397. It stands to reason that the further disconnected the criminal act is 
from a purported military objective, the easier it will be to show predisposi-
tion. For instance, if a soldier commits rape based on a superior order, it is 
hard to imagine how this would not satisfy the subjective test since there 
would be absolutely no possible military reason for committing this act. On the 
other hand, killing unarmed individuals may seemingly serve a military objec-
tive (even if it turns out not be) and so close analysis of the soldier’s response 
to the order and her prior experience would be required before determining 
whether she was otherwise predisposed. See infra Section IV.C. Any lingering 
issues with using the subjective entrapment test in the military context is not 
fatal to my argument but simply means that the objective entrapment test 
probably should be the favored test when employing my reconceptualized obe-
dience to orders defense. 
 398. See supra Part IV.A.4. 
 399. See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 15, 18–20 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 815, 818–20 (2012)); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra 
note 28, at R.C.M. 306; Richard Cole, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Military 
Justice System: Is It Time for a Change?, 19 Am. Crim. L. 395 (1992) (discuss-
ing how military commanders hold prosecutorial discretion unlike in the civil-
ian context where prosecutors decide what charges to bring).   
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prosecution in this situation given that the soldier—unlike her 
entrapped counterpart—is performing a vital service for the 
government.  
The alternative would be to use the objective test. This 
would involve examining the circumstances under which the 
order was given. The operative question would be whether the 
government’s tactics would have caused a law-abiding hypo-
thetical soldier to follow the order.400 This hypothetical soldier 
could be similar to a person of common understanding.401
In the military context, the government’s actions would re-
volve around the situation in which the soldier finds herself, in-
cluding the nature of the order, the way in which it was given, 
the amount of time given to execute it, etc. All of these factors 
come into play when deciding if a hypothetical soldier would 
have followed the order or could have resisted the command. 
For instance, the soldier could have received the order on the 
battlefield, where there was no time to question or clarify the 
order. This would suggest a successful application of the objec-
tive test. On the other hand, it may turn out that the order was 
given in a strategic meeting where there was plenty of time to 
question or otherwise challenge the order without any immedi-
ate consequences. These factors may militate in favor of convic-
tion. None of this takes away from the fact that, unlike in the 
civilian context, the subordinate is obligated to follow the order. 
Still, there are circumstances that would make it easier (or less 
difficult) for the soldier not to obey the order. The greater this 
likelihood, the less successful the obedience to orders defense 
would be under this test. 
 The 
basic point here is to postulate a general objective standard 
that is not tied to the defendant’s particular experiences and 
training. Unlike the current objective scrutiny, however, the 
inquiry here focuses on the government’s actions and their ef-
fect on a soldier of common understanding rather than the de-
fendant’s state of mind and whether her understanding of the 
law comports with that of a person of “common understanding.”  
 
 400. Like with the current obedience to orders defense, presumption would 
favor the defendant. See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 28 (C.M.A. 
1973) (starting presumption with an obedience to orders defense is that orders 
under question were lawful). The government would have to show that a hypo-
thetical soldier of common understanding would have been able to refuse the 
order.  
 401. The aforementioned issues of how to define a person of common un-
derstanding remain. See supra Part II.A. But this does not undercut the in-
stant analysis on the basic contours of the defense.  
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It is important to understand the different role the “soldier 
of common understanding” plays in an entrapment-based objec-
tive test as opposed to the current dual state-of-mind model. 
With an entrapment model, the focus is on the effect of the or-
der on a person of common understanding,402 whereas under 
the current objective element of the obedience to orders de-
fense, the focus is on what a person of common understanding 
would have known.403 In other words, the proposed objective 
test would use this hypothetical person to scrutinize the cir-
cumstances surrounding the order and ask whether a soldier 
would have done the same thing instead of using it as a check 
on the defendant’s state of mind and asking whether the soldier 
would have known the same thing.404
Using the entrapment-based framework also tracks the ra-
tionale of the objective test and its focus on utilitarian princi-
ples.
 
405 Exonerating the soldier will help encourage the gov-
ernment to better train commanding officers so that future 
soldiers are not placed in such compromising situations. Again, 
we are not dealing with interactions among private citizens. 
Because the government has better control over commanding 
officers than civilians with no connection to the government, it 
makes sense that the objective scrutiny and its underlying ra-
tionale are aimed at regulating government behavior rather 
than the subordinate’s behavior.406
One may argue, however, that regulating the behavior of 
soldiers caught in this situation is just as important as regulat-
ing the behavior of commanding officers who promulgate the 
  
 
 402. See supra Part IV.A. 
 403. See supra Part I.D. 
 404. Exactly how this objective test would be administered in a court-
martial setting probably needs further development. This Article, however, is 
less concerned with the intricacies of how this test would be applied (though 
this is definitely an important enterprise) and more interested in constructing 
a framework that would justify its use in the first place.  
 405. See, e.g., Dillof, supra note 358, 860–61 (discussing the theoretical un-
derpinnings of the objective test). 
 406. It does not matter that the soldier, in promulgating an unlawful order, 
is not necessarily seeking to convict the subordinate solider, unlike the police 
officer who is trying to get the civilian to commit the crime. The overall aim of 
deterring improper or unwanted government behavior still applies in both 
scenarios. In the civilian context, this takes the form of deterring overzealous 
or otherwise extreme tactics by the police so they do not get a conviction at 
any cost. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 1, at 406 (1985). In the military 
context, it takes the form of deterring commanding officers from issuing un-
lawful orders to fulfill the mission at any costs or to satisfy other improper mo-
tives.  
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order.407 The same can be said of entrapment. Regulating be-
havior of entrapped citizens is just as important as regulating 
the behavior of undercover police officers. This is a valid point, 
yet in the entrapment context, courts have not tailored the de-
fense’s elements accordingly.408 The focus squarely falls on the 
government’s actions.409
The possibility that a commanding officer may not know 
the order is unlawful does not change the foregoing analysis. It 
is true that with civilian entrapment, police officers know that 
the targeted act is a crime and intentionally try to pressure cit-
izens to commit it.
 It is for a different day to argue wheth-
er entrapment should be changed. This Article takes the de-
fense and its underlying rationale at face value. If this doctrine 
serves its purpose and its underlying rationales appropriately 
account for the government role in the crime, then for the rea-
sons described herein, obedience to orders should be realigned 
in the same way.  
410 Commanding soldiers may not necessarily 
share the same specific intent. This person, too, may simply be 
following orders from a higher-ranked individual. However, 
from the perspective of the subordinate, nothing has changed. 
She, like her civilian counterpart, is being pressured to commit 
a crime. Indeed, even under the current obedience to orders 
standard, the commanding officer’s knowledge (or lack of 
knowledge) of the unlawful nature of the order is not relevant 
to the analysis.411
Another concern may be the types of crimes to which the 
entrapment defense traditionally applies. The defense is typi-
cally restricted to victimless crimes such as drug offenses or 
gun sales, and does not apply to crimes involving bodily inju-
ry.
  
412 However, with obedience to orders cases, the crimes can 
range from inhuman treatment, to theft, to homicide.413
 
 407. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing regulation of subordinate soldier 
behavior through the extant obedience to orders defense, and touching on the 
limits of the defense in shielding subordinate behavior). 
  
 408. See supra Part IV.A. 
 409. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13. 
 410. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932) (noting that 
entrapment occurs “when the criminal design originates with the officials of 
the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the dis-
position to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission”). 
 411. To the extent the commanding officer was aware of the unlawful na-
ture of the order, this individual could be prosecuted directly for giving the or-
der. See supra note 130.  
 412. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(3) (“The defense [of entrapment] is un-
available when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the of-
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A few things can be said here. First, military courts do not 
appear to restrict entrapment to a specific set of crimes.414 Se-
cond, there is no logical reason why this defense should not ex-
tend to any crime as long as the elements are met, even as-
sault-related crimes. The rationales for either test would seem 
to apply regardless of the nature of the crime. But even if en-
trapment should be restricted to certain crimes, it does not fol-
low that such restrictions should apply in the obedience to or-
ders context. The government coercion is qualitatively greater 
in the military setting. Instead of trickery, instigation, or other 
enticements, a military order comes with the threat of criminal 
punishment.415 It stands to reason that the greater the govern-
ment coercion, the more expansively the entrapment doctrine 
should apply to serious crimes.416
 
fense charged . . . .”); Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public 
Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 61, 107 (2007); 
Lombardo, supra note 
 Furthermore, acts of violence 
are looked upon differently in a military context because often 
the job of a soldier is to kill, assault, etc. 
28, at 210; Troy A. Wolf, Persistence Pays: Enforcement 
Efforts to Solicit Illegal Activity—United States v. Hinton, 908 F.2d 355 (8th 
Cir. 1990), 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 913, 913 n.2 (1991). 
 413. See supra Part I. 
 414. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 28 M.J. 401, 407 (C.M.A. 1989); 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at R.C.M. 916(g); MILI-
TARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 179, § 5-6. 
 415. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2012). 
 416. This realigning also tracks the classification of these defenses as ex-
cuses rather than justifications. These quasi-legal concepts seek to capture the 
overall nature of the act. A justification defense exculpates otherwise criminal 
conduct because the conduct was considered the right thing to do. See, e.g., 
Donald L. Horowitz, Justification and Excuse in the Program of the Criminal 
Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 109 (seeking to further ex-
plicate the difference between excuse and justification). An excuse defense also 
exculpates otherwise criminal conduct, only this time the conduct is deemed 
wrongful, but the defendant is not blameworthy because of the specific cir-
cumstances surrounding the offense. Id. Focusing on the victim’s role or lack 
of it, both obedience to orders and entrapment would be classified as excuse 
defenses. See Bedi, Excusing Behavior, supra note 354, at 620 (arguing that 
where victim played no active role in crime, criminal defense should be labeled 
as excuse); Eugene R. Milhizer, The Divestiture Defense and United States v. 
Collier, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1990, at 3, 10 (noting that obedience to unlawful or-
ders functions as an excuse, not a justification); Dru Stevenson, Entrapment 
and Terrorism, 49 B.C. L. REV. 125, 135 n.39 (2008) (noting that entrapment is 
considered an excuse rather than a justification). 
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C. DISTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE: TWO REAL WORLD 
HYPOTHETICALS  
The primary purpose of this Article is to provide a frame-
work for the obedience to orders defense that is conceptually 
more sound that the current model. Using the structure of en-
trapment appropriately recognizes the government’s role in the 
crime. But this is not simply an academic exercise. This recon-
ceptualization creates a defense that is more narrowly tailored 
and, in turn, more accurately tracks our intuitive notions of 
when liability should be imposed. 
It is true that entrapment, relative to other civilian crimi-
nal law defenses, is rarely successful.417 This should not cause 
any concerns with the instant analysis. There is no reason to 
think that the basic structure of the defense is inherently over-
ly disadvantageous to defendants. Its limited success may 
simply be due to its application in the police-inducement cases. 
Since the pressure typically stems from inducement or trickery, 
a jury may assume that the defendant is otherwise predisposed 
to commit the crime, or that the hypothetical person should 
presumptively be able to resist the government tactics. This 
may explain why defendants typically don’t succeed in raising 
this defense. But in the military, the pressure is qualitatively 
greater, and soldiers are generally expected to obey orders.418
The following two situations illustrate how the entrapment 
model more accurately comports with our intuitive notions of 
punishment. First, take the Calley case, detailed earlier.
 In 
short, there is a presumption of obedience that is simply not 
present in the civilian context. This can explain why the en-
trapment model could serve soldiers better than their civilian 
counterparts.  
419 
Calley claimed that he was ordered to fire upon what appeared 
to be villagers who posed no threat to him or other soldiers.420 
Even though he had prior experience with villagers fighting for 
the enemy, in this particular situation there was no indication 
that the villagers posed a threat or were otherwise fighting for 
the enemy.421
 
 417. See supra note 
 According to Calley, the initial order to kill the 
villagers came a day before, when the entire platoon was being 
briefed on the mission by Calley’s commanding officer, and 
48. 
 418. See supra Part II.B. 
 419. See supra Part I.E.1. 
 420. See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 24 (C.M.A. 1973). 
 421. Id. at 24, 33. 
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twice again during the day of the shootings.422 For our purpos-
es, let us assume that such an order was in fact given, though 
the testimony on this issue was disputed in the case.423 It is 
worth noting that Calley also ordered his subordinates to shoot 
on the villagers (again in compliance with his commanding of-
ficer’s order), though some subordinates refused to carry out 
the order.424 As previously discussed, the jury found Calley 
guilty of murder, and the court reasoned that a soldier of com-
mon understanding in the same situation would have known 
the order was unlawful.425
Contrast this scenario with the following hypothetical. A 
soldier in a combat situation overseas is ordered to shoot at a 
local hospital and kill what appear to be doctors and nurses. 
These individuals are taking care of wounded enemy soldiers 
and, by all accounts, appear to be non-combatant medical pro-
fessionals. Assume that this soldier has had significant train-
ing and experience in similar combat situations and has been 
deployed on a number of life-threatening missions. As it turns 
out, she has been involved in numerous prior engagements 
where local hospitals have served as fronts for enemy installa-
tions. Enemy soldiers were dressed as doctors and nurses to 
camouflage their appearance. This soldier had a number of en-
counters where she fired on these enemy soldiers. On the in-
stant mission, the soldier and her commanding officer are be-
hind enemy lines taking fire from enemy soldiers. The soldier 
sees what appear to be doctors and nurses but, based on her 
prior experience with similar facilities, strongly suspects that 
they are likely enemy targets who are camouflaging their true 
identities. Nevertheless, because she is not sure, the soldier in-
quires further from her superior, who immediately cuts her off 
and again orders her to shoot on the hospital personnel. She 
ends up killing a number of individuals. It turns out that these 
were actual healthcare workers, not enemy soldiers. She is lat-
er prosecuted for murder and raises the obedience to orders de-
fense. 
 This result follows our intuitions 
that Calley should be held responsible for his actions.  
Using the current dual requirement model, my hypothet-
ical soldier would have the same fate as Calley and also be 
found guilty of murder. She will likely survive the subjective 
 
 422. Id. at 23–24. 
 423. Id. at 23. 
 424. Id. at 24. 
 425. See supra Part I.E.1.  
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prong of the defense. It does not appear that she knew the or-
der was unlawful and that she was firing on innocent individu-
als. Again, the focus here is on the soldier’s state of mind and 
her related prior experience and training. She had previously 
seen hospitals that were used as fronts for enemy installations. 
This prior experience made her susceptible to thinking that the 
hospital personnel in the instant situation also posed a threat.  
However, she will most likely fail the objective scrutiny el-
ement. Would a person of common understanding have known 
the order to be manifestly illegal? Probably. Again, this hypo-
thetical soldier does not carry any of the personal experience or 
training of the defendant. Similar to Calley’s prior experience 
with villagers serving as enemy soldiers, this soldier’s prior ex-
perience with hospitals serving as enemy fronts is not relevant. 
The inquiry centers on a gut reaction of the order standing 
alone. The fact that the defendant was taking fire is also not 
relevant to assessing this knowledge requirement. What mat-
ters is what a soldier would have perceived in the defendant’s 
situation. Here, the defendant was asked to attack what ap-
peared to be doctors and nurses. These individuals were behind 
enemy lines treating wounded soldiers and gave no indication 
that they were combatants. A jury could easily find that a per-
son of common understanding would have known the order was 
unlawful at first blush and thus convict the defendant of mur-
der.  
This result seems counterintuitive, particularly when the 
soldier tried to question the order, even amidst enemy fire. 
None of these mitigating factors were present in Calley’s situa-
tion,426
Employing the entrapment model instead better serves our 
intuitions in distinguishing these two cases. Using the subjec-
tive test, the analysis centers solely on the defendant’s state of 
mind.
 which may explain why our intuitions differ in the in-
stant case. Yet, under the current model, my hypothetical sol-
dier and Calley stand together. The hesitation and urgency of 
the situation are not important, because the operative question 
under this test focuses on whether a soldier of common under-
standing would have known the order was unlawful, not 
whether such a soldier of common understanding would have 
followed the order.  
427
 
 426. See Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 23–24. 
 Was my hypothetical soldier predisposed to commit the 
 427. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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crime? A jury would look at a variety of factors, including the 
soldier’s prior history of this type of conduct, the eagerness or 
reluctance to obey the order, and whether the soldier suggested 
taking the action. My hypothetical soldier had no history of fir-
ing on innocent medical personnel. In her prior deployments, 
the soldier only encountered and fired upon hospitals that 
served as enemy fronts. She also tried to question the order, 
showing that she was reluctant to shoot the individuals. Final-
ly, the soldier did not suggest taking the action. Combined, the-
se facts point to someone who was not predisposed to commit 
the crime. This tracks our intuitions that the hypothetical sol-
dier should not be responsible.  
The facts relating to Calley would suggest a different con-
clusion under the subjective test, and rightfully so. While the 
evidence indicated Calley did not have a history of firing on in-
nocent villagers,428 the other considerations would militate in 
favor of predisposition. There was no evidence that he ques-
tioned the commanding officer’s order or otherwise showed any 
reluctance in following it.429 He was presumably first given the 
order at a briefing the day before but did not show any hesita-
tion at that time, or any time thereafter.430 Furthermore, he 
commanded his subordinates to carry out the killings.431 While 
some refused, Calley followed through on shooting the civil-
ians.432
The objective test, and its focus on the nature of the order 
and the surrounding circumstances, also preserves our intui-
tions regarding these two cases. Here, a court would ask 
whether a soldier of common understanding in the same posi-
tion realistically would have been able to resist or otherwise re-
fuse the order.
 Together, these facts point to someone who seemed ea-
ger or otherwise inclined to carry out the act. This conclusion 
tracks our intuitions that Calley, but not my hypothetical sol-
dier, should be held responsible for the killings.  
433
 
 428. See Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 23–25. 
 Take again my hypothetical soldier. Here, it 
seems that the circumstances would not have allowed a soldier 
to refuse or otherwise effectively question the order. Timing 
was of the essence, as they were taking fire from another direc-
tion. The defendant in fact tried to question the order, which 
 429. Id. at 23–24. 
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. at 24. 
 432. Id. 
 433. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
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her commanding officer quickly repeated. The collective cir-
cumstances suggest that no soldier of common understanding 
would have been able to effectively refuse the order.  
Calley’s case comes out differently under this objective test. 
There is no evidence suggesting Calley was required to take 
immediate action.434 A soldier of common understanding in his 
shoes could have refused the order or otherwise waited before 
ordering his subordinates to kill the villagers. Indeed, the first 
order came at a briefing the day before, which would have giv-
en Calley plenty of time to raise concerns or other questions.435 
Moreover, during the actual engagement, Calley was not taking 
enemy fire or otherwise pressured by the circumstances to im-
mediately follow through on the order.436 It appears that the vil-
lagers were safely guarded, and time was not necessarily of the 
essence.437 Perhaps most damning was the fact that other sol-
diers refused to obey Calley’s order to kill the villagers,438
The reason the entrapment-based model more closely 
tracks our intuitions has a lot to do with the contextual speci-
ficity with which it is applied compared with the abstract gen-
erality with which the current dual state-of-mind requirement 
is employed. Both entrapment tests keep the focus on the situa-
tion at hand—analyzing either the soldier’s state of mind or the 
circumstances surrounding the feasibility of refusing the order. 
The current objective standard, however, takes the focus too 
much away from the particulars of the situation and instead 
asks what an abstract soldier knows who is not otherwise em-
bedded in what may be a precarious and volatile situation. 
Keeping the perspective on the individual situation thus pro-
vides a more narrowly tailored defense that better comports 
with our intuitions on how these two cases should be re-
solved.
 bol-
stering the claim that a soldier in Calley’s position surely could 
have refused.  
439
 
 434. See Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 23–24. 
  
 435. Id. at 23. 
 436. See id. at 24. 
 437. See id. 
 438. Id. 
 439. One may take issue with my hypothetical and accuse me of construct-
ing a scenario that quite conveniently passes both entrapment tests. Suppose 
that my hypothetical soldier did not question the order, or that she was not 
taking enemy fire. Would these differences potentially change the results un-
der the subjective and objective entrapment tests? Yes. But there is nothing 
problematic with this result. The purpose here was to present a scenario 
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  CONCLUSION   
One of the primary aims of criminal law is for the govern-
ment to regulate behavior among its citizens. For this reason, 
criminal law statutes, by and large, apply uniformly to all citi-
zens. Logically, it makes sense that criminal law defenses 
should also aim to regulate behavior and establish a uniform 
standard. This is why almost all these defenses (e.g., self-
defense, duress, and mistake of law) require the court to engage 
in some level of objective scrutiny. To allow otherwise would 
frustrate the aim of establishing a uniform code of criminal 
conduct. Idiosyncratic beliefs and characteristics would ulti-
mately create inconsistent verdicts among defendants.  
But the considerations are different when the same gov-
ernment prosecuting the case is also pressuring the defendant. 
While regulating behavior remains important, the focus shifts 
from the behavior of private citizens to the behavior of the gov-
ernment. Indeed, this seems to be the crux of the entrapment 
defense and its unique requirements. This focus on the gov-
ernment holds with greater force in the military context. Sol-
diers perform a valuable service for the government—a service 
that requires obedience to orders. We must be mindful of this 
consideration when constructing the contours of an obedience 
to orders defense should they commit a crime in connection 
with their service. To be sure, soldiers face a striking dilemma 
when confronted with an order that turns out to be unlawful. 
Disobeying the command carries the threat of criminal pun-
ishment, but following the order may also lead to criminal pun-
ishment. To some extent, this situation cannot be fully pre-
vented, nor should it be. We do not want soldiers to blindly 
follow their superiors if this means committing a crime. How-
ever, reconceptualization of the obedience to orders defense 
along the lines of entrapment satisfies this concern without 
unduly prejudicing the defendant or placing future soldiers in 
similar compromising situations. The inquiry appropriately 
keeps the focus on the specific situation and in turn preserves 
our intuitions of when liability should be imposed. The end re-
sult is a defense that is more narrowly tailored than the cur-
 
where our intuitions clearly differ from the Calley case. Revising my scenario 
along the aforementioned lines only means that our intuitions may not be 
clear and that reasonable jurors could disagree whether my soldier should be 
found guilty. I welcome this conclusion. This Article’s realignment of obedience 
to orders does not seek to create a foolproof defense, but rather one that is 
more narrowly tailored to the situation and in turn better tracks our intuitions 
(to the extent there is agreement) than the current model.  
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rent defense, and one that better serves soldiers caught in this 
difficult situation.  
 
 
